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Summary 
Ikujiro Nonaka proposed the distinction between tacit and explicit knowledge in his classic 
paper “The knowledge-creating company”. Nonaka’s archetypes proved foundational for the 
field of knowledge management, dominating subsequent theoretical discourse and strongly 
influencing knowledge management strategy in the years that followed. The influence of 
Nonaka’s tacit-versus-explicit distinction on knowledge management strategy can be seen 
most clearly in a paper published by Hansen, Nohria and Tierney entitled “What is your 
strategy for Managing Knowledge?” in the Harvard Business Review. Building on Nonaka’s 
tacit-versus-explicit distinction, Hansen et al. contend that an organization’s knowledge 
management strategy must either focus on codification or on personalization, highlighting 
how each of these strategies exhibits distinct organizational characteristics and warning that 
attempting to straddle both strategies risks organizational failure. 
While Nonaka’s tacit-explicit paradigm remains influential as a foundational concept in 
knowledge management, Hansen et al.’s extension of this concept has subsequently been 
criticized and disproved by several authors. This thesis takes a fresh look at Hansen et al.’s 
theory in the context of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) to 
determine whether NASA conforms to Hansen et al.’s theory and whether this 
conformity/non-conformity has any effect on NASA’s effectiveness as a knowledge 
organization as predicted by Hansen et al. However, while authors to-date have focused on 
whether an organization conforms to one of Hansen et al.’s extreme archetypes, none have 
looked at the evolution of an organization’s knowledge management practices over time 
through the lens of Hansen et al. NASA is a knowledge-intensive organization with a long and 
publicly-available record that not only documents its of knowledge management practices 
but also its successes and failures as well as the considerations that shaped its knowledge 
management strategy. 
This analysis uses the organizational characteristics identified by Hansen et al. to evaluate 
NASA’s current competitive strategy, knowledge-economics model, knowledge management 
strategy, I.T. strategy and human resources strategy. The analysis also shows how NASA’s 
previous knowledge management strategies focused alternately on personalization and then 
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on codification, and how NASA experienced and responded to the respective limitations of 
each strategy. The results of the analysis show that NASA cannot be classified as either 
pursuing an archetypical codification or personalization strategy, and that despite straddling 
both strategies the organization is showing a strong positive performance. 
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Opsomming 
Ikujiro Nonaka het in sy klassieke artikel "The Knowledge Creating Company" 'n onderskeid 
tussen stilswyende en eksplisiete kennis getref wat in die veld van kennisbestuur 'n 
fundamentele onderskeid geword het en die teoretiese diskoers oorheers het.  Die 
onderskeid het onder meer die kennisbestuurstrategie in die daaropvolgende jare sterk 
beïnvloed. Hierdie invloed is duidelik waarneembaar in 'n belangrike artikel deur Hansen, 
Nohria en Tierney, getiteld "Wat is jou strategie vir die bestuur van kennis?" in die Harvard 
Business Review. Die artikel beweer dat 'n organisasie se kennisbestuurstrategie óf moet 
fokus op kodifikasie of op personalisasie, en beklemtoon hoe elk van hierdie strategieë met 
afsonderlike organisatoriese eienskappe gepaardgaan en waarsku dat 'n poging om beide 
strategieë te volg waarskynlik onsuksesvol sal wees. 
Terwyl Nonaka se idees steeds 'n invloedryke grondbeginsel van kennisbestuur is, het 
verskeie latere outeurs Hansen et al. se toepassing van hierdie idees op 
kennisbestuurstrategie gekritiseer. Hierdie tesis oorweeg Hansen et al se teorie in die konteks 
van die "National Aeronautics and Space Administration" (NASA) om te bepaal of die 
organisasie se kennisbestuurstrategie Hansen et al. se teorie gestand doen en of enige effek 
op NASA se doeltreffendheid as 'n kennisorganisasie soos voorspel deur Hansen et al. 
naspeurbaar is. Hoewel skrywers tot op datum gefokus het op die vraag of 'n organisasie aan 
een van Hansen et al. se uiterste argetipes voldoen of nie, het niemand tot dusver na die 
evolusie van 'n organisasie se kennisbestuurstrategie en praktyke gekyk deur die lens van 
Hansen et al. se teorie nie. NASA is 'n kennisintensiewe organisasie met 'n lang en publiek 
toeganklike dokumentasie van die kennisbestuurspraktyke wat gevolg is, sowel as oor 
suksesse en mislukkings, en die oorwegings wat bepalend vir hulle kennisbestuurstrategie 
was. 
Hierdie analise gebruik die organisatoriese eienskappe wat deur Hansen et al. geïdentifiseer 
is om NASA se huidige strategie, kennis-ekonomiese model, kennisbestuurstrategie, 
informasie tegnologie strategie en menslike hulpbronne strategie te evalueer. Die analise 
toon hoe NASA se vorige kennisbestuurstrategieë afwisselend gefokus het op personalisering 
en kodifikasie, en hoe NASA die onderskeie beperkings van elke strategie ervaar het en 
daarop gereageer het. Die resultate van die analise toon dat NASA nie geklassifiseer kan word 
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as 'n organisasie met 'n tipiese kodifikasie- of personaliseringsstrategie nie, en dat die 
organisasie, ten spyte van Hansen et al. se argument, 'n sterk positiewe prestasie getoon het. 
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1. Introduction  
1.1 Background 
In 1991 Ikujiro Nonaka proposed the distinction between tacit and explicit knowledge in his 
classic paper “The knowledge-creating company” (Nonaka, 1991). Tacit knowledge is 
characterized as being highly personalized therefore difficult to formalize, and typically 
perceived to be knowledge that resides in a person’s head. Explicit knowledge is more formal 
and systematized, and is most often equated with knowledge codified on paper. Nonaka’s 
archetypes proved foundational for the field of knowledge management, dominating 
subsequent theoretical discourse and by extension strongly influencing knowledge 
management strategy in the years that followed.  
The influence of Nonaka’s tacit-versus-explicit distinction on knowledge management 
strategy can be seen most clearly in a paper published in the Harvard Business Review in 1999 
entitled “What is your strategy for Managing Knowledge?” by Hansen, Nohria and Tierney. 
Building on Nonaka’s tacit-versus-explicit distinction, Hansen et al. (1999) contended that an 
organization’s knowledge management strategy must either focus on codification (based on 
explicit knowledge) or on personalization (based on tacit knowledge). Hansen et al. 
highlighted how each of these strategies exhibits distinct organizational characteristics and 
warned that attempting to straddle both strategies would lead to the risk of organizational 
failure. Hansen’s et al.’s (1999) theory is also interesting because the authors make bold 
assertions that are fundamentally connected with their own perception of how knowledge 
should be defined and the way in which it should be managed. Chief among these is Hansen’s 
et al.’s perceived co-dependency between innovation and personalization, and the idea that 
codification and personalization practices should be treated as substitutes than as 
complements when it comes to managing knowledge.  
While Nonaka’s tacit-explicit paradigm remains influential as a foundational concept in 
knowledge management, Hansen et al.’s (1999) extension of this concept into the 
codification-versus-personalization paradigm has been criticized and disproved by several 
authors. Hansen et al. can arguably be considered at risk of being discounted as being 
outdated and irrelevant, as the thinking around knowledge management strategy has ‘moved 
on since then’. However, Hansen et al.’s theory nevertheless retains value as it extends 
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Nonaka’s foundational concepts into their strategic equivalents. It seems that Hansen et al.’s 
resulting archetypes are rarely mirrored in actual organizations, but remain useful in denoting 
the two extreme types between which a knowledge management strategy can locate and 
characterize itself.  
This thesis will investigate current knowledge management practices at the National 
Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) in order to find out whether NASA’s 
organizational structure and its knowledge management practices align it with Hansen et al.’s 
(1999) archetypical codification-based or personalization-based organizations. NASA was 
actively engaged in efforts to better manage its knowledge in 1990s, and can be considered 
to be an early-adopter at a time when knowledge management practices advocating the 
codification of knowledge were current. This study will not only look at NASA’s knowledge 
manage practices, but also how and why it got there. 
Whether NASA aligns or not with one of these archetypes will help to determine whether 
having a knowledge management strategy that is predominantly characterized by codification 
or personalization is necessary for organizational success, or whether attempting to straddle 
both strategies will result in organizational failure. This will support a second aspect of the 
analysis, which is to show how NASA’s knowledge management strategy has evolved over 
time, since the advent of Nonaka’s tacit/explicit distinction to the present day. This will show 
how in the early days knowledge management at NASA focused on personalization and then 
in the mid-1990’s altered its focus to codification before finally a mixed strategy as NASA 
experienced and responded to the limitations inherent in each strategy over the years.  
This is important because authors to-date in their criticisms of Hansen et al. (1999) have 
focused on whether an organization conforms to one of Hansen et al.’s extreme archetypes 
at a point in time. No authors have taken an organization and used Hansen et al. to look at 
the evolution of its knowledge management practices over time. However, because NASA is 
an innovative and knowledge intensive organization with a readily available record of 
knowledge management practices going back at least as far as the early 1980s it is possible 
to apply Hansen et al. (1999) to NASA in this way.  
In order to use NASA as a test case for Hansen et al.’s (1999) theory this study needs to 
determine the conceptual boundaries of Hansen et al.’s theory, identify the key elements of 
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Hansen et al.’s (1999) theory, and then review knowledge management activities at NASA in 
terms of each of these elements to determine the extent to which knowledge management 
activities at NASA conform with Hansen et al.’s theory. This will be done in the next section.  
1.2 Hansen et al.’s (1999) theory 
In 1999 a paper by Hansen, Nohria and Tierney entitled “What is your strategy for Managing 
Knowledge?” appeared in the Harvard Business Review. The paper was attempting to show 
that when it comes to managing its knowledge, an organization must decide between taking 
an approach that is either predominantly about codification or an approach that is 
predominantly about personalization. Hansen et al.’s theory highlighted how each strategy is 
characterized by specific organizational characteristics, and concluded with the caveat that 
attempting to straddle both strategies is likely to undermine organizational success. This 
section provides a brief overview of Hansen et al.’s (1999) paper, highlighting it main points 
with respect to codification versus personalization.  
 Hansen et al.’s (1999) paper in brief 
Hansen et al. (1999) begin by explaining that the growth in intellectual assets in organizations 
across the world has resulted in the increased need for knowledge management practices 
and I.T. capabilities to support these knowledge management practices.  
The two main strategies identified by Hansen et al. (1999) are (i) the strategy of codification 
of knowledge, and (ii) the strategy of personalization knowledge. They explain the nature of 
each of these strategies, and then go into further detail concerning the economic model, 
knowledge management strategy, information technology requirements, and human 
resources implications of each strategy.  
Hansen et al. (1999) substantiate the discussion with examples of how these two different 
strategies are used across different management and strategic consultancies, noting that 
because these organizations involve knowledge intensive practices they tend to be leaders in 
knowledge management and in using I.T. to support knowledge management. The authors 
go on to show how these principles are also applied by organizations in the healthcare sector, 
and in the industrial sector. 
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The paper then goes on to discuss how the characteristics of the company will influence the 
choice of strategy and identifies some key questions that can help to clarify how choice of 
knowledge management strategy can support competitive strategy. Hansen et al. (1999) also 
discuss additional concerns such as whether different knowledge management strategies can 
be applied to different business units within the same organization, and how to adapt to the 
commoditization of knowledge over time. 
A summary of the above points with respect to the codification and personalization strategies 
will follow here, as well as regarding the role of company characteristics, the key questions, 
and the additional concerns. The real-world examples used by Hansen et al. (1999) to 
illustrate the discussion will not be included, as the intention is to summarize the theoretically 
relevant points of Hansen et al.’s paper rather than to replicate its whole contents. 
 The codification strategy 
Hansen et al. (1999) do not commit to a stated definition of codification, but rather explain it 
throughout the paper by reference to examples:  
“Knowledge is carefully codified and stored in databases, where it can be accessed and 
used easily by anyone in the company. We call this the codification strategy.” (Hansen 
et al., 1999: 107). 
“Knowledge is codified using a “people-to-documents” approach: it is extracted from 
the person who developed it, made independent of that person, and reused for various 
purposes.” (Hansen et al., 1999: 108). 
Based on the examples given by Hansen et al. (1999), it can be concluded that codification is 
a process whereby knowledge is made independent of the originator by being converted into 
a knowledge asset that can be used by other persons to achieve an outcome requiring 
specialist knowledge that they do not themselves possess. 
Note that in this case a knowledge asset could be taken to mean a paper document, electronic 
document, process or procedure, or electronic system. Codification means that knowledge is 
not tied to the originator. When incorporated into the competitive strategy of an 
organization, this means that that knowledge assets are developed once, and then 
transferred into a document repository or system that allows it to be reused many times over 
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to implement high-quality, reliable, fast solutions in other projects that have similar 
requirements.  
In terms of economics, one of the main benefits of codification is that costs to produce 
knowledge are incurred once, and this knowledge can then be reused across multiple 
projects. Knowledge reuse reduces the turnaround time on projects, thereby increasing 
efficiency and reducing costs. The standardized approach tends to also be less intensive in 
terms of communications, as staff are implementing a solution rather than developing one. It 
also means that staff can be deployed in larger teams with a high ratio of less 
skilled/experienced staff. The resulting economies of scale allow for more projects to be 
undertaken at a lower cost and in a shorter time, resulting in higher revenues and a higher 
company growth rate.  
The knowledge management strategy that underpins this is a people-to-documents 
approach. This means extracting expertise from specialists and storing it in knowledge objects 
for reuse. These knowledge objects can be designed at the outset, or they can be adapted by 
taking deliverables from a previous project and making them re-usable for other projects. A 
knowledge object may be a document but could also take the form of an algorithm in a 
system. These knowledge objects can subsequently be used by junior consultants to 
implement complex projects.  
The codification approach tends to require a bigger investment in information technology, as 
more complex systems are needed to store and disseminate the reusable knowledge, and to 
provide systematic support (for example, to prompt call center users to ask the right 
questions and provide them with the correct responses). This generally means investing in 
databases, search engines and/or customer records management systems.  
From the human resources perspective, pursuing a codification strategy requires investment 
in the people and technology to facilitate administration and implementation of knowledge 
assets. These would not be experts in that field of knowledge, but could be administrative 
staff such as content managers to curate and maintain the knowledge assets, and staff to 
implement the knowledge assets (typically junior consultants). Since products are intended 
to be standardized, staff could be trained in groups or using online training, rather than direct 
person-to-person mentoring. Graduate-level staff tend to be more affordable, allowing for a 
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higher ratio of lower-level consultants to highly skilled/experienced consultants. A basic 
amount of high-level staff will persist because there will still be the need for some person-to-
person knowledge transfer to ensure that codified knowledge is appropriately applied. The 
incentive structures in the company would need to be set up to reward contributions to the 
knowledge base, and the proper use of the systems. 
 The personalization strategy 
Hansen et al. (1999) similarly do not provide a consolidated definition of ‘personalization’, 
but rather explain it through examples:  
 “[personalization initiatives] focus on dialogue between individuals, not knowledge 
objects in a database. Knowledge that has not been codified—and probably couldn’t 
be—is transferred in brainstorming sessions and one-on-one conversations. 
Consultants collectively arrive at deeper insights by going back and forth on problems 
they need to solve.” (Hansen et al., 1999: 107) 
“… knowledge is closely tied to the person who developed it and is shared mainly 
through direct person-to-person contacts. The chief purpose of computers at such 
companies is to help people communicate knowledge, not to store it. We call this the 
personalization strategy.” (Hansen et al., 1999: 107) 
Based on these descriptions, personalization can be defined as a process that seeks to 
facilitate the transfer of knowledge and/or the generation of insights through increased 
interaction between individuals, groups or communities, either directly or indirectly through 
a system.  
An organization seeking to leverage personalization of knowledge in its competitive strategy 
will be aiming to provide innovative, analytically-rigorous advice on strategic problems by 
channeling the expertise of highly skilled/qualified individuals.  
In terms of economic strategy, value comes from innovation and customized solutions for 
unique, high-level strategic issues that although resulting in higher costs also commands a 
significantly higher price tag with higher profit margins than under a codification strategy. 
Teams are smaller in size, with a higher ratio of experts as they rely on the individual expertise 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
 7 
 
of highly qualified and experienced consultants. Due to the high cost of developing the 
necessary expertise, such organizations tend to exhibit slower growth.  
The knowledge management strategy revolves around person-to-person transmission of 
knowledge. This necessitates drawing on networks of other experts to share tacit knowledge 
that is generally too context specific to be effectively codified. This can help to tap into 
experience from across many projects and specializations, as well as geographically diverse 
experience. 
Information technology plays a more limited role under a personalization strategy. Its main 
focus is on systems that help foster networks of people. This frequently includes 
telecommunications, videoconferencing, and directories of experts (also referred to as 
‘people finders’). While a document repository is generally still required, this serves a more 
basic objective of holding background information and technical details to support the 
project, rather than being the source of the solution. Such an organization also typically incurs 
higher travel, costs as physical meetings are emphasized in addition to telecommunications.  
The human resources element under a personalization strategy also differs compared to that 
of a codification strategy. Under a personalization strategy, the organization relies on its 
ability to recruit and retain highly qualified staff. For management consultancies this typically 
means M.B.A. holders with a tolerance for ambiguity and a high capacity for problem solving. 
Standardized training is replaced by mentoring programs and an emphasis on the 
accumulation of experience. Collaboration and knowledge-transfer between experts is also 
essential, meaning that staff need to be encouraged to collaborate and co-operate (for 
example by returning phone calls promptly), or for example by transferring staff between 
offices to facilitate the establishment of social networks.  
 The dangers of attempting to straddle both strategies 
Hansen et al. (1999) devote a section to warning of the potential dangers of straddling both 
strategies. Attempting to straddle both codification and personalization strategies can lead 
to confusion as staff are under pressure to behave as both implementers of a standardized 
solution (codification) and strategic innovators trying to develop a customized solution 
(personalization), or they come into conflict with other staff as they try to enact different 
strategies for the same solution.  
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Attempting to codify and reuse material can also result in disappointment on the client side 
when the solution is not specialized enough to addresses the client’s particular problem. 
Codification may have failed to capture enough of the rich tacit knowledge embodied in the 
source, creating knowledge objects that are not versatile enough and became 
counterproductive. When the knowledge objects lack detail, the burden of providing that 
additional tacit knowledge can end up falling on staff that do not have the capacity to handle 
the load as the situation starts to revert to seeking a personalized solution.  
In cases such as the one described above, where an organization recognizes that the generic 
nature of its solutions is inadequate and tries to compensate by undertaking expensive 
innovation and personalization of products, the organization can undermine its primary 
strategy of low-cost service provision through reuse of knowledge objects. This can result in 
escalating costs and expanding timelines for the client, and reduced margins for the provider.  
 Company characteristics and choice of strategy 
As mentioned above, Hansen et al. (1999) give examples of management and strategic 
consultancies, as well as of organizations in the healthcare sector and the industrial 
manufacturing sector, describing how the organization’s strategy influences its choice of 
knowledge management strategy and its decision as to whether to pursue a codification or a 
personalization strategy.  
The paper discusses how Andersen Consulting, Ernst and Young, Access Health, and Dell 
Computers use codification to drive their low-cost, high-growth company strategy. By 
contrast, organizations like Bain, Boston Consulting Group, McKinsey, Memorial Sloan-
Kettering Cancer Centre, and Hewlett-Packard use personalization to support their company 
strategy of providing highly-customized services and innovative products. Hansen et al. also 
discuss the case of CSC Index, an organization that attempted to straddle both codification 
and personalization strategies and ended up undermining its own competitive strategy.  
 Three questions to clarify choice of strategy 
Since an organization’s competitive strategy should drive the choice of knowledge 
management strategy, an organization must be clear on what its competitive strategy is. 
Hansen et al. (1999) provide three questions that can help an organization to clarify how its 
choice of knowledge management strategy can support competitive strategy.  
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Question 1: Does the organization offer standardized products or customized products? For 
standardized products, codification is best. For a customized product, personalization is 
recommended.  
Question 2: Does the organization have a mature product or an innovative product? Mature 
products make a codified approach possible, while innovative products are better handled 
using a personalization strategy.  
Question 3: Do staff rely on explicit knowledge or tacit knowledge to solve problems? If staff 
rely on explicit knowledge, codification works better. If staff rely on tacit knowledge, 
personalization is better. As tacit knowledge exchange requires a lot of nuance and detail, 
trying to convert inherently tacit knowledge into explicit knowledge is likely to fail. 
 Two additional concerns 
The paper notes that there are two additional concerns that need to be taken into account 
when selecting a knowledge management strategy. These are (i) whether you can apply 
different knowledge management strategies to different business units, and (ii) how to 
respond to the commoditization of knowledge over time.  
In answer to the first question, Hansen et al. note that codification and personalization 
strategies can co-exist in an organization, but there must be an emphasis on one while the 
other strategy plays a supporting role. An exception could be made when business units 
operate in relative isolation, under which circumstances each business unit could operate 
under its own competitive- and knowledge-management strategy, and staff would not come 
into conflict with one another to undermine the benefits.  
With respect to the commoditization of knowledge, some knowledge-intensive 
products/services can become standardized (commoditized) over time and thereby become 
cheaper and more plentiful. This means that where a certain product/service used to require 
a skilled expert to do the work, the problem is now well-understood and sufficiently advanced 
methodologies/systems/processes have been developed that a standardized solution can be 
implemented by a less qualified person. This can reduce the competitive strategy of 
companies pursuing a personalization strategy and relying on the need for expensive experts 
in that field.  
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In a situation where the knowledge in a certain field has become commoditized, an 
organization that relies on innovation (personalization) should move out of that area and into 
new fields that require expert advice. Organizations specializing in implementation 
(codification) should invest expertise in commoditized knowledge as it matures, acquiring it 
and moving it to reuse and scalability. The fundamental message here is that organizations 
should keep their knowledge management strategy unchanged and focus on finding markets 
where it can be put to better use. 
 Conclusion of Hansen et al.’s paper 
As a final caveat, Hansen et al. (1999) note that knowledge management needs to be 
integrated with the organization’s competitive strategy, not just farmed out to the I.T. or 
human resources department.  
Selecting the appropriate knowledge management strategy will benefit both the organization 
and the customer. However, in the absence of such a choice the customer may get an 
inappropriate solution and staff become confused about priorities. Ultimately, strong 
leadership is needed to select the appropriate knowledge management strategy and 
implement it correctly. 
1.3 Methodology 
Hansen et al.’s (1999) theory can be summarised as containing three assertions: 
 An organization can focus primarily on codification or personalization. Even if not 
explicitly stated, the choice will be evident in the knowledge management practices 
as well as the competitive strategy, information technology setup, and human 
resources implications. 
 Depending on what approach is primary, the other approach can play a supporting 
role.  
 The two approaches cannot be given equal emphasis without compromising the 
effectiveness of the organization.  
These assertions can be seen as a set of conditions (1 and 2) and a prediction (3) and provide 
a simple framework for testing if Hansen et al.’s theory holds for knowledge management at 
NASA. On a basic level, it can be expected that either: 
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Outcome 1: NASA is consistent with Hansen et al.’s (1999) knowledge management 
conditions and as predicted by Hansen et al.’s theory is succeeding as an organization, or  
Outcome 2: NASA is not consistent with Hansen et al.’s (1999) and as predicted by Hansen et 
al.’s theory is failing as an organization. 
Outcomes 1 and 2 are consistent with Hansen et al.’s (1999) theory. However, there are other 
alternatives that would call the validity of Hansen et al.’s theory into question, specifically: 
Outcome 3: NASA is consistent with Hansen et al.’s (1999) knowledge management 
conditions but contrary to predictions by Hansen et al.’s theory is failing as an organization. 
Note that if this is the case it should be considered that this failure could be due to a factor 
unrelated to knowledge management practices.   
Outcome 4: NASA is not consistent with Hansen et al.’s (1999) knowledge management 
conditions but contrary to predictions by Hansen et al.’s theory is succeeding as an 
organization.  
These outcomes can be represented in the following table: 
Table 1 Potential outcomes of the analysis 
 NASA succeeding? NASA failing? 
Scenario A: 
NASA follows Hansen’s 
KM rules 
 
Outcome 1: 
Hansen’s predictions 
are consistent 
Outcome 3: 
Hansen’s prediction 
did not hold 
Scenario B: 
NASA does NOT follow 
Hansen’s KM rules 
 
Outcome 4: 
Hansen’s predictions 
did not hold 
Outcome 2: 
Hansen’s predictions 
are consistent 
To populate the above analysis, three questions need to be resolved: 
 Is NASA focusing primarily on either a codification or a personalization strategy? 
This could be resolved through reviewing materials available on NASA’s knowledge 
management portal, reading transcripts of interviews with NASA CKO’s and papers written by 
them, and NASA’s Knowledge Map.  
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This will be undertaken in chapter 3 (Case Analysis), which has four subsections to consider 
what sort of knowledge management model NASA is pursuing by considering what its 
competitive and knowledge-economics strategy, its knowledge management strategy, its 
human resources approach, and its I.T. strategy tell us about its approach to knowledge 
management. The characteristics raised by Hansen et al. (1999) in relation to codification and 
personalization can be summarised in the table below: 
Table 2 Organizational characteristics under codification and personalization strategies 
 CODIFICATION PERSONALISATION 
Competitive 
strategy 
 
High quality and reliable 
products/services provision with 
fast turnaround and low costs, 
resulting in rapid growth of 
market share. 
Customized, innovative 
products/services delivered by 
channeling individual expertise. This 
means slower turnaround and higher 
cost, but steady growth and a high 
quality/success ranking. 
Economic model 
 
Reuse economics means invest 
once in a knowledge asset, reuse 
many times; large teams with high 
ratio of juniors to seniors; Focus is 
on generating large overall 
revenues. 
Expert economics means highly-
customized solutions to unique 
problems; small teams with a low 
ratio of juniors to seniors; high fees 
focused on maintaining high profit 
margins. 
Knowledge 
management 
strategy 
 
People-to-documents emphasizes 
electronic systems that codify, 
store, disseminate and allow 
reuse of knowledge. 
People-to-people emphasizes 
dialogue between people, to 
develop networks so that tacit 
knowledge can be shared directly.  
I.T. strategy 
 
Invest heavily in I.T. to connect 
people with re-usable codified 
knowledge. 
Invest moderately in I.T. and use it to 
facilitate conversations and the 
exchange of tacit knowledge. 
Human resources 
strategy 
 
Recruit young, less experienced 
staff to act as implementors of 
reusable knowledge assets. 
Training is standardized for 
groups or through online training. 
People incentivized to contribute 
to document databases.  
Recruit highly-qualified/experienced 
staff to apply their analytical and 
creative skills to unique problems. 
Staff are developed through 
mentoring and accumulation of 
experience. 
Staff are rewarded for sharing 
knowledge with others. 
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By looking at how NASA conforms to these parameters it will be possible to tell is focusing 
primarily on a codification or a personalization strategy. 
 Is there evidence of a dominant approach or is there evidence of straddling? 
It is not enough to show that a particular strategy (e.g., personalization) is being followed. It 
must also be clarified whether the alternative strategy is in a supporting role (i.e., following 
the 80-20 rule), whether the alternative is absent altogether, or whether there is evidence of 
straddling. Straddling could be taken to be where the supporting strategy represents more 
than 20% in the strategic mix.  
This will be considered in chapter 4 (Discussion), which will summarize the findings under 
chapter 3 (Case Analysis) on the following table (Table 3 Organizational scorecard showing 
example values) to determine whether NASA is primarily following one strategy or another, 
or a mixture of the two.  
Recall that Hansen et al.’s (1999) theory is concerned with how an organization with a specific 
knowledge management strategy will tend to have specific organizational characteristics that 
support that strategy. For example, companies with a codification strategy will tend to exhibit 
compatible human resources and I.T. strategies, as described above. For this reason, the table 
below shows how an organization can be evaluated on separate organizational characteristics 
to determine whether all parts of the organization are consistently working in support of a 
codification or personalization strategy, or whether the organization has mixed 
characteristics that could potentially work at cross-purposes to one another.     
Once the organization’s characteristics have been evaluated against Hansen et al.’s (1999) 
archetypes, the average will reflect something close to a 50-50% split for a balanced strategy 
or an 80-20% split for a strategy that is biased in favor of one approach (as envisaged by 
Hansen et al., 1999).  
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Table 3 Organizational scorecard showing example values 
 Codification Personalization 
Competitive strategy & knowledge-economics 80% 20% 
Knowledge management strategy 50% 50% 
Human resources strategy   
I.T. strategy   
Overall   
Populating the table above will produce a summary of the results of this study with respect 
to how NASA conforms to Hansen et al.’s (1999) two main categories of knowledge 
management practices. 
 Effectiveness: Is NASA succeeding or failing as an organization?  
Hansen et al. (1999) do not provide much guidance on what qualifies an organization as 
successful. For example, an organization can be exhibiting success in the short term but fail 
in the long term; the failure could be due to extraneous factors such as economic downturn, 
a poor policy environment or political interference (especially likely for government 
agencies).  
This will be considered in chapter 4 (Discussion), which will review reports that show what 
proportion of NASA’s projects are on-track, how well NASA is meeting its performance 
objectives and also how satisfied NASA staff are with their workplace. The idea is that if NASA 
is failing as an organization due to staff conflict over knowledge management practices, it 
should reflect in these metrics.  
 Conclusion on methodology 
Resolving these three questions will provide enough evidence to place NASA in one of the 
quadrants on Table 1 (Potential outcomes of the analysis) and make an informed evaluation 
of whether knowledge management activities at NASA are consistent with Hansen et al.’s 
(1999) theory, or whether they present challenges to this theory.  
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1.4 NASA – a good test case for Hansen et al.’s theory 
This section will give some background on NASA and explain why NASA is a favorable choice 
for testing the theory of codification versus personalization presented by Hansen et al. (1999). 
 A bit of background on NASA and its centers 
The National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) is an independent agency of the 
United States government responsible for the civilian space program, as well as aeronautics 
and aerospace research. Its predecessor was the National Advisory Committee for 
Aeronautics (NACA, founded in 1915), which was essentially transformed into NASA in 1958 
(‘National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics’, 2018). It has an estimated 17,381 employees 
across ten field centers, and in 2017 commanded an annual budget of US$19.5 billion (‘NASA’, 
2018).  
NASA’s vision, mission and strategic goals are spelled out on NASA’s website (‘NASA Strategic 
Plan 2018’, 2018). They are as follows: 
NASA’s Vision: “To discover and expand knowledge for the benefit of humanity”  
NASA’s Mission: 
“Lead an innovative and sustainable program of exploration with commercial and 
international partners to enable human expansion across the Solar System and bring 
new knowledge and opportunities back to Earth. Support the growth of the Nation’s 
economy in space and aeronautics, increase understanding of the Universe and our 
place in it, work with industry to improve America’s aerospace technologies, and 
advance American leadership.” (‘NASA Strategic Plan 2018’, 2018: 6) 
NASA’s four strategic goals: 
 Discover: Expand human knowledge through new scientific discoveries  
 Explore: Extend continuous human presence deeper into space and to the moon for 
sustainable long-term utilization 
 Develop: Address national challenges and catalyze economic growth [through the 
promotion of new technologies] 
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 Enable: Optimize capabilities and operations [referring to proper management of 
human capital, operations, and infrastructure, as well as promoting productive 
partnerships] 
From the Vision, Mission and Strategic goals it is clear that NASA positions itself as a leader in 
innovation across a wide range of applications and challenging fields. 
NASA is not characterized by a single, central location. Its operations are spread across 
multiple field centers in the United States, each specializing in a different aspect of the 
sciences and technologies that support NASA’s missions and projects in pursuit of the four 
strategic goals. The NASA Education Implementation Plan (2015 - 2017) (2015: 22) provides a 
useful summary description of the ten NASA field centers, showing the extent of the work 
they do: 
 Ames Research Center (ARC): Ames specializes in research geared towards creating 
new knowledge and new technologies that span the spectrum of NASA interests.  
 Armstrong Flight Research Center (AFRC): As the lead for flight research, Armstrong 
continues to innovate in aeronautics and space technology.  
 Glenn Research Center (GRC): Glenn Research Center develops and transfers critical 
technologies and systems for safe and reliable aeronautics, aerospace, and space 
applications.  
 Goddard Space Flight Center (GSFC): The mission of the Goddard Space Flight Center 
is to expand knowledge on the Earth and its environment, the solar system, and the 
universe through observations from space.  
 Jet Propulsion Laboratory (JPL): The Jet Propulsion Laboratory, managed by the 
California Institute of Technology, is NASA’s lead center for robotic exploration of the 
solar system.  
 Johnson Space Center (JSC): From the early Gemini, Apollo, Skylab and Shuttle Projects 
to today’s International Space Station program, Johnson Space Center continues to 
lead NASA’s effort in Human Space Exploration.  
 Kennedy Space Center (KSC): Kennedy Space Center leads the world in preparing and 
launching missions around the Earth and beyond.  
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 Langley Research Center (LRC): Langley continues to forge new frontiers in aviation 
and space research for aerospace, atmospheric sciences, and technology 
commercialization.  
 Marshall Space Flight Center (MSFC): Marshall Space Flight Center is world leader in 
the access to space and use of space for research and development to benefit 
humanity.  
 Stennis Space Center (SSC): Stennis is responsible for NASA’s rocket propulsion testing 
and for partnering with industry to develop and implement remote sensing 
technology. 
In addition to the field centers, NASA also has mission directorates (Aeronautics Research 
Mission Directorate, Science Mission Directorate, Human Exploration and Operations Mission 
Directorate, and Space Technology Mission Directorate), a mission support directorate 
(covering things like procurement, infrastructure, shared services etc.), and long-term 
projects that complement and support the work done at the field centers (NASA Organization 
Chart, 2015).  
NASA is recognized as the creator and user of some of the United States’ highest technology1. 
However, a sequence of disasters in the late 1990’s and the early 2000’s resulted in 
investigations by government and regulatory bodies that highlighted concerns about 
knowledge management practices at NASA: 
 A series of Mars mission failures (Climate Orbiter, Polar Lander and Deep Space 2) 
resulted in an investigation by the Government Accountability Office (GAO) in 2002. 
The GAO subsequently expressed its concerns about its findings in a report entitled 
“NASA: Better Mechanisms Needed for Sharing Lessons Learned”.  
 Soon after in 2003, the Space Shuttle Columbia Disaster occurred. Among its findings, 
the Columbia Accident Investigation Board (CAIB) Report stated that NASA “has not 
demonstrated the characteristics of a learning organization” (Columbia Accident 
Investigation Report: Volume 1, 2003:12).  
                                                        
1 Gregory Whitesides, Executive Director of the National Space Society, cited in Sternstein (2006: 40-41).   
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 In 2011 the NASA Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel (ASAP) recommended that the 
agency undertake a more systematic approach to capturing implicit and explicit 
knowledge, and furthermore that NASA appoint an agency level chief knowledge 
officer (NASA Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel - Annual Report 2011: 2012).  
The recommendations from these reports drew attention to the way in which knowledge 
management was being practiced at NASA, highlighting weaknesses and prompting the 
agency to take action. Each subsequent incident and the ensuing Reports resulted in a review 
of practices, fundamental changes in how NASA approached knowledge management, and 
more resources being devoted to the discipline.   
As a result, NASA has seen a steady evolution in how it practices knowledge management in 
order to reach the point it is at today. With chief knowledge officers coordinating across field 
centers and departments, it is possible to analyze NASA’s approach to knowledge 
management and determine how accurate Hansen et al.’s (1999) predictions are when it 
comes to evaluating the practices of what is arguably one of the most pre-eminent 
knowledge-based organizations in the world. 
 Why is NASA a good choice for testing Hansen et al.’s theory? 
Since the disasters mentioned above, NASA has had time to refine its approach to knowledge 
management. Given that it is a federally-funded civilian program, a lot of comprehensive 
documentation about its knowledge management practices are publicly available.  
There is the potential caveat to this that, as described above, NASA is not a single organization 
but is actually comprised of many different organizations working together. While this is true, 
it will also be shown in the discussion on NASA’s knowledge management journey (section 
3.2.1) that NASA follows a federated approach to knowledge management whereby 
knowledge management activities across all its centers is directed by one chief knowledge 
officer at the center. This means that although there is a degree of autonomy at each center, 
there is still a consistent thread that runs through the culture of knowledge management at 
NASA.  
This makes NASA a good case study, as it provides the knowledge management community 
with insight into how this knowledge-intensive organization has defined its critical knowledge 
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activities and selected a knowledge management strategy to match. NASA is a good candidate 
for testing Hansen et al.’s (1999) framework for a number of reasons:  
NASA is a knowledge-intensive organization 
Hansen et al.’s (1999) framework is specifically concerned with knowledge-intensive 
organizations and seeks to show how an organization’s choice of knowledge management 
strategy can have a direct impact on that organization’s efficacy.   
It would be difficult to contend that there is such a thing an organization that does not 
leverage on knowledge to some degree, and Hansen et al. (1999) do not stipulate that there 
are organizations to which their framework will not apply. However, it stands to reason that 
Hansen et al.’s framework is best illustrated in a knowledge-intensive organization where the 
effects (or lack thereof) will be most clearly observable.  
For example, in an organization that depends heavily on a specific commodity it may be 
difficult to determine whether the organization’s efficacy is being affected by volatility in 
commodity prices, exchange rates, labor costs or other factors, or whether it is attributable 
to matching the knowledge management strategy to appropriate economic, I.T. and human 
resources strategies. 
NASA provides a good test case because it is focused on leveraging knowledge to address 
highly-specialized problems. NASA does not have any direct competitors and is federally 
funded. This means that it is unlikely to experience volatility due to a substitute in the market 
and is also insulated to a large extent from the market forces that other firms need to 
consider. Therefore, NASA is relatively pure example of a knowledge-intensive firm that 
removes many of the extraneous factors that could complicate the analysis of an organization 
operating in normal market conditions.  
Operational information available to the public 
Evaluating Hansen et al.’s (1999) framework in terms of a real organization requires a lot of 
information about that organization to be available. This is challenging, as privately owned or 
commercial companies have an interest in protecting their intellectual property in order to 
maintain their competitiveness in the market. Similarly, many government agencies are 
engaged in work that they consider sensitive, such as military or defense.  
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NASA is not subject to these same considerations. Due to NASA being a federally funded 
civilian program, a lot of information about its activities and the research it generates is open 
to the public and available on its web portal. NASA also has – amongst its multiple objectives 
- the explicitly stated goals (‘Office of STEM Engagement: Overview’, no date) of:  
- Strengthening NASA and the Nation's future workforce  
- Attracting and retaining students in science, technology, engineering and 
mathematics, or STEM, disciplines 
- Engaging Americans in NASA's mission 
The attainment of these goals is facilitated by NASA making its information available to the 
public. This open access is enhanced by a directive issued by the White House Office of 
Science and Technology Policy (OSTP) in 2013 that set a goal of making direct results of 
federally funded science freely accessible to the public to the greatest extent possible (‘OSTP 
Memo Sets Goal of Public Access’, 2013). The directive does make exceptions with respect to 
sensitive materials such as patents and material governed by personal privacy, proprietary, 
or security laws (‘All Scientific Research Funded by NASA Is Available For Free’, 2018). 
This means that Information about NASA is more freely available than for most other 
knowledge intensive organizations, facilitating the analysis of NASA’s activities in a way that 
would not be possible for most organizations.  
 
Clearly identifiable knowledge management initiatives 
As referenced above (1.4.1 A bit of background on NASA and its centers), subsequent to the 
Mars mission failures and the Columbia disaster, NASA was given a mandate to implement 
better mechanisms for sharing lessons-learned, improve its capacity to learn as an 
organization, and undertake a more systematic approach to capturing knowledge.  
This means that NASA has appointed an agency chief-knowledge officer (CKO) as well as 
knowledge management leaders (such as CKOs and knowledge-services leads or KSLs) at all 
of its centers and departments. Numerous knowledge-management initiatives have been 
detailed in NASAs knowledge management map and the NASA online portal.  
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It is an acknowledged problem that many organizations do not have an explicitly defined 
knowledge management capacity, sometimes relegating this to either I.T. or human resources 
functions where it is undertaken by personnel who have no experience of knowledge 
management. as Hansen et al. (1999) point out, ‘companies that isolate knowledge 
management in functional departments like HR and IT risk losing its benefits’ (1999: 115). 
Therefore, in testing Hansen et al.’s framework, it is preferable to use an organization where 
knowledge-management professionals are working to explicitly manage knowledge. This is 
expected to provide a more robust analysis than assuming that initiatives undertaken in other 
departments are proxies for knowledge management.  
Publicly available performance metrics 
A fundamental aspect of Hansen et al.’s (1999) framework is that an organization cannot 
straddle both the codification and the personalization knowledge strategies without 
potentially compromising its own effectiveness and undermining its own competitive 
advantage.  
This means that in order to evaluate the efficacy of Hansen et al.’s (1999) framework, it is not 
only necessary to identify the nature of an organization’s knowledge strategy, but also 
whether the organization is functioning effectively. If an organization is straddling both 
strategies, then according to Hansen et al. this can lead to confusion among its knowledge 
workers and compromise the efficacy of the organization. On the other hand, if an 
organization is able to straddle both strategies and still function effectively, this would be 
inconsistent with Hansen et al.’s predictions and could indicate a weakness in Hansen et al.’s 
framework.  
NASA makes a good test case because the agency’s activities are extensively reviewed in line 
with the requirements of the Government Performance and Results Act (GPRA) 
Modernization Act of 2010 (FY 2019 Volume of Integrated Performance, undated: i). The 
results are published in NASA’s annual Volume of Integrated Performance, which shows 
ratings in terms of both performance goals and annual performance indicators for each 
project. Independent rankings of NASA’s employee satisfaction are also available online (‘Best 
Places to Work in the Federal Government’, 2017); this is a relevant metric, as a workplace 
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where knowledge workers are confused or frustrated is likely to rank poorly or show a 
declining trend in workplace satisfaction.  
These reviews provide a good indication of whether NASA is succeeding or failing as an 
organization. When combined with what analysis shows about NASA’s knowledge 
management strategy, this will give an indication of whether Hansen et al.’s (1999) 
predictions are robust or not.   
 Conclusion on NASA as a test case for Hansen et al. 
For the reasons outlined above, NASA is expected to provide a good test case for Hansen et 
al.’s (1999) framework. It is an organization engaged in knowledge intensive work, there is a 
lot of publicly available information available about the organization, it has clearly defined 
knowledge managers and knowledge management practices, and there are readily available 
performance metrics against which the success of the organization can be evaluated. This is 
the type of organization and information needed to test the application of Hansen et al.’s 
framework to determine whether the theory is accurate. 
1.5 Chapter outline 
Chapter 1 has introduced the topic, a summary of Hansen et al.’s (1999) paper, outlined the 
methodology that will be followed in this thesis, and explained why NASA is a good test case 
for Hansen et al.’s theory. The thesis will now proceed in the following manner: 
Chapter 2 (Theory) will discuss the theory in greater detail, looking at the literature to see 
how Hansen et al. (1999) can be contextualized in the broader field of knowledge 
management, how Hansen et al.’s  theory has fared when reviewed by other authors, and 
whether authors involved in Hansen et al.’s  original paper have any subsequent work that 
provides additional insights.  
Chapter 3 (Case Analysis) will look at NASA’s organizational characteristics to examine how 
NASA’s activities measure up against the organizational characteristics from Hansen et al.’s 
(1999) theory that were identified in chapter 1. Accordingly, this chapter has been broken up 
into sub-sections to enable each organizational characteristic to be dealt with more clearly 
on its own.  
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Chapter 4 (Discussion) will evaluate the results of chapter 3 (Case Analysis) to see if NASA’s 
knowledge management strategy is based predominantly on codification or personalization, 
or whether NASA shows evidence of attempting to straddle both. Based on NASA’s mix of 
activities in this regard, Hansen et al.  (1999) makes predictions about how NASA should be 
performing as an organization. It will also analyze NASA’s performance to determine whether 
the findings support Hansen et al.’s (1999) predictions. This will give an indication as to the 
robustness of the predictions made by Hansen et al.’s theory.  
Chapter 5 (Conclusion) considers the extent to which NASA’s has supported or disagreed with 
Hansen et al.’s (1999) theory. Where disagreement is found, there is an attempt to identify 
the differences in perspectives that led to the disagreement. The overall findings of the study 
are discussed, potential weaknesses are reflected on, and further avenues for research are 
proposed. 
This is followed by a list of the References used in this study. Note that this is a list of 
references used, not a Bibliography of sources consulted. It also does not contain details of 
papers cited by authors referenced in the text, as these have not been consulted directly. 
However, where another source has been cited by a reference, efforts to include details of 
this source are included as a footnote in the text.  
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2. Theory: Knowledge Management Strategy 
Since the publication of Hansen et al.’s (1999) theory there have been publications that have 
discussed, applied and/or critiqued the theory, including further work by one of the authors 
involved in the original [1999] publication. 
This chapter will summarize some of these publications in order to:  
(i) explain the conceptual perspective that Hansen et al. (1999) appear to be taking 
on the nature of knowledge,  
(ii) consider some of the critiques raised about Hansen et al.’s theory, and  
(iii) see if subsequent work involving one of the original authors of the Hansen et al. 
(1999) paper provides further insights into the theory.  
The first is useful because by understanding what Hansen et al. (1999) perceive knowledge to 
be, it helps to clarify their assumptions about how they assume it should be handled and 
potentially also identify potential strengths, weaknesses and contradictions associated with 
that view.  
The second is useful because this study may have the following outcomes:  
 This study may find that NASA conforms to Hansen et al.’s (1999) theory, potentially 
disagreeing with points raised by these critical authors and opening an avenue for 
further investigation. 
 This study may show that NASA does not conform to some specific aspect of Hansen 
et al.’s (1999) theory, and these studies may corroborate the finding by showing that 
this has previously been identified by other authors as a weak point in Hansen et al.’s 
theory, thereby adding weight to their arguments.  
 On the other hand, this study may show that NASA does not support Hansen et al.’s 
(1999) theory due to an aspect of the theory that has never before been criticized by 
other authors, again opening an avenue for further investigation. 
The third point (work involving one of the original authors) is useful because it provides an 
author of the original paper the opportunity to potentially clarify points in the previous paper 
that met with contention, or even revise parts of the theory. On the other hand, it may also 
show that years down the line one of the original authors still stands by their original claims.  
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2.1 What perspective do Hansen et al. take on the nature of knowledge? 
Hansen et al. (1999) see personalization as a scenario under which essential knowledge can 
be held in the heads of highly qualified consultants. This suggests that Hansen et al. views 
knowledge in a manner consistent with the epistemology of possession. Under the 
epistemology of possession, knowledge is:  
“… seen as a personal property of the individual knower who is able to confer meaning on data 
and information by drawing from his or her own subjective experiences, perceptions and 
previous understandings.” (Newell et al., 2009: 3). 
In the field of knowledge management, the epistemology of possession is closely tied to the 
Structural perspective of knowledge (Newell et al., 2009: 7), and these both take an 
‘entitative’ view of knowledge (Newell et al., 2009: 12). That is to say, this perspective views 
knowledge as an object or resource that can be possessed, accumulated, and transferred. 
This has as its basis the idea that knowledge can exist independently of context, which has 
attracted criticism from subsequent theorists that consider this closer to being ‘information’ 
than knowledge. 
The Structural perspective is also criticized on the grounds that it sees organizations as “a 
collection of interdependent parts (e.g., machines and people) that work in harmony towards 
a common, agreed-upon goal (e.g., organizational survival and profit).” (Newell et al. 2009: 
13).  This is also apparent in the quote above that refers to knowledge as “a personal property 
of the individual knower” [my emphasis] (Newell et al., 2009: 3), and is reflected in Hansen et 
al.’s (1999) theory when they cite some management consultancies as utilizing a competitive 
strategy based on “channeling individual expertise” [my emphasis] (Hansen et al., 1999: 109). 
Hansen et al.’s (1999) example of codification is focused on organizational staff acting 
primarily as ‘implementors’ of codified ‘knowledge’. That Hansen et al. are comfortable with 
the concept that what has been codified into documentation or systems can be referred to 
as “knowledge” again shows that Hansen et al. see knowledge along the lines of an 
epistemology of possession.  
Furthermore, Hansen et al.’s (1999) version of codification includes a scenario whereby 
Access Health uses a call-center with a “clinical decision architecture” system to help a nurse 
to make recommendations to callers/patients. This is basically the application of a ruleset. 
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This general approach is described and criticized by the CKO of NASA’s Goddard Space Flight 
Center, Dr Edward Rogers (2011: 18), when he cites Shukla and Srinivasan (2002)2 as stating 
“the purpose of first-generation KM programs is to improve operational efficiency of the 
employees by enhancing access to rule sets”, and in the same paper links this to a statement 
[cited] by McElroy (1999)3 that “conventional knowledge management practice, then, boils 
down to little more than getting the right knowledge to the right people at the right time. 
Think single-loop learning”. Rogers (2011:18) is showing that this approach is old-fashioned 
and outdated when it comes to knowledge management practices.   
The epistemology of possession and the structural perspective of knowledge has come to be 
seen as outdated compared to more recent theories that see knowledge as a practice or a 
process (rather than a thing) that is undertaken as a more social and organizational activity 
(rather than an individual/expert activity) (Newell et al. 2009: 14).   
Newell et al. (2009: 134) note:  
“The Hansen study focused on consulting firms, and, […], it is possible to question whether 
their [Hansen et al.’s] analysis emphasizes the role of individual experts at the expense of the 
role of groups and communities in creating and sharing knowledge. It may be relevant for 
consultancy firms employing talented individuals, but it is doubtful whether it applies to all 
organizations.” 
Therefore, it can be seen that Hansen et al.’s (1999) theory has been built on the foundation 
of a structuralist perspective and incorporates the limitations inherent to that perspective. 
The fundamental blind spot in Hansen et al.’s theory appears to be that between 
personalizing knowledge in individuals and codifying knowledge in I.T. systems, Hansen et al. 
(1999) have missed the role played by the organization. The organization makes knowledge 
work into a group activity (social), and provides, enabling contexts that bring together 
different groups, and shared purpose that helps to define priorities, and processes to help 
negotiate the meaning of knowledge in question (Newell et al. (2009: 14).  
                                                        
2 Rogers (2011) cites this article but does not include its citation in his references.  
3 McElroy, M.W. (1999). Double-Loop Knowledge Management, MacroInnovation Inc. Available from 
www.macroinnovation.com 
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Since the organization does not come into Hansen’s et al.’s (1999) theory, and Hansen et al. 
view knowledge a resource that needs to be held somewhere, Hansen et al. are forced to 
allocate the knowledge either to the individual (through personalization) or to a repository 
(through codification). 
2.2 Papers that raise critiques of Hansen et al. (1999)  
Hansen et al.’s (1999) theory has resulted in papers that focus quite specifically on 
weaknesses in their theory. What follows here are five papers that criticise various aspects of 
Hansen et al.’s theory.  
 Liu, Chai, and Nebus (2013) 
A paper by Liu, Chai, and Nebus (2013) states that “In recent years many studies have revealed 
that organizations should adopt a mixed strategy.”. Liu et al. (2013) cite papers by Scheepers 
et al. (2004), Greiner, Bohmann, and Krcmar (2007), Kumar and Ganesh (2011), as well as an 
article by Koenig (2001).  Liu et al. (2013) join these authors in proposing the desirability of a 
mixed strategy. The purpose of Liu et al.’s paper is to develop a systematic framework 
whereby an organization can analyze its knowledge reuse processes and balance its mix of 
codification and personalization based on their knowledge management costs/benefits. 
Liu et al. (2013) take a more complicated perspective than Hansen et al. (1999) when it comes 
to talking about what constitutes knowledge, specifically referring to the category of reusable 
knowledge. They are not referring to the codification of documents and simple if-then rules. 
Liu et al. (2013) describe how re-usable knowledge is characterized by levels of complexity 
and significance. Complexity refers to a high time and effort input required from both 
producers and users of re-usable knowledge, while significance refers to knowledge with a 
high value (such as engineering solutions process innovations, and engineering know-how). 
They point to the distinction between problem-driven reuse, that focuses on solving an 
immediate problem, and knowledge-driven reuse, that is concerned with continuous 
improvement. Liu et al.’s (2013) study focuses on knowledge-driven reuse. 
Liu et al.’s (2013) conclusion is that “Balancing codification and personalization strategies is 
crucial for improving knowledge reuse within an organization” (Liu et al., 2013: 769). Liu et al. 
hold that by taking into account the number of reusable knowledge items, reuse patterns, 
and interest alignment between employees and the company, an organization can select the 
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right mix of codification and personalization strategies (Liu et al., 2013: 770). This is in direct 
opposition to Hansen et al. (1999), who clearly states that organizations must not straddle 
both strategies or they will risk failure (1999: 112).   
 Greiner, Bohmann and Krcmar (2007) 
Greiner et al. (2007) were cited by Liu et al. (2013) as one of the papers supporting the 
feasibility of a mixed knowledge management strategy. Greiner et al. (2007) were concerned 
with studying the influence of organizational environment on the selection of knowledge 
management strategy. They achieved this by undertaking case studies of 11 companies, 
wherein they categorized the knowledge management initiatives across six criteria and 
evaluated how these fitted with the business strategy of the organizational unit.  
While Greiner et al. (2007) agreed with Hansen et al. (1999) when they concluded that “the 
knowledge management objectives and strategy need to concur with the company’s/business 
unit’s objectives and strategy” (2007: 13), they also noted that: 
“[the analysis] also showed that some companies deploy both approaches – 
codification and personalization – within the same KM initiative. This supports 
propositions that codification and personalization are not two extremes but rather 
dimensions that can be combined (Gammelgaard and Ritter, 2005)” (Greiner et al., 
2007: 11).  
This was followed by the further observation that:  
“The case studies did not clearly indicate a higher level of success for the companies 
that used both approaches. But it can be assumed that a sole reliance on one strategy 
may be too one-sided, e.g. a sole concentration on codification and reuse of knowledge 
may not be enough to face the dynamic and turbulence of the markets (Afuah, 1998). 
On the other side, bringing people together does not necessarily lead to innovation if 
the knowledge is not exploited.” (Greiner et al., 2007: 11). 
Therefore, while Greiner et al. (2007) do not find that a mixed strategy clearly results in either 
failure or success of an organization, they do end up siding with the critics of Hansen et al. 
(1999) expressing their belief that codification and personalization strategies can be 
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combined in an organization and that a single strategy may be too one-sided (Greiner et al., 
2007: 11).  
 Koenig (2001) 
Koenig’s (2001) article appeared in KM World Magazine. It is brief, and by far the most vocal 
critic of Hansen et al.’s (1999) propositions with the statement “While the advice to match 
one’s strategy with the context is admirable, the “Do not straddle” advice is overly simplistic; 
indeed, it is dangerously misleading.”  
Koenig (2001) focuses his criticism on the 80-20 strategy split advocated by Hansen et al. 
(1999: 112) and advocates greater variability in the split. Koenig (2001) goes on to qualify this 
by claiming to have undertaken quantifiable and rigorous research into pharmaceutical 
companies that shows:  
“[…] that the most salient difference between the less successful vs. the more 
successful pharmaceutical companies is that the less successful firms have a 
knowledge environment with an 80-20 emphasis (on codification), while the more 
successful companies, have an equal emphasis on codification and on personalization. 
They have deliberately adopted the 50/50 straddle that Hansen, Nohria and Tierney 
advise us to avoid.” Koenig (2001).  
Koenig (2001) concludes by supporting the notion that knowledge management strategy 
should align with business strategy, but appears closely allied to Liu et al. (2013) in concluding 
that straddling is not a recipe for disaster as predicted by Hansen et al. (1999), and that the 
correct balance of codification and personalization could lie anywhere between the 80-20 mix 
advocated by Hansen et al. (1999).   
 Kumar and Ganesh (2011) 
Kumar and Ganesh (2011) are investigating the knowledge management strategies followed 
by product development (PD) units in Indian manufacturing firms. They surveyed 284 
employees across 19 different PD units to determine whether the strategy being followed 
was codification or personalization, and conducted a number of statistical tests and analyses 
on the information they gathered. They found that although personalization was the 
preferred strategy, codification was not clearly in a supporting role. That is to say, they 
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concluded that Hansen et al.’s (1999) 80-20 rule was not being observed. Despite this, they 
did not observe any significant negative influences as a result.  
Kumar and Ganesh (2011) refer to Hansen et al.’s (1999) approach as the ‘biased approach’ 
(i.e., biased in favor of one strategy), and where neither strategy dominates they refer to it as 
a ‘balanced approach’ (2011: 19). Kumar and Ganesh (2011) cited a paper by Haesli and Boxall 
(2005)4 that supported Hansen et al.’s (1999) biased approach, but also cited research by 
Jasimuddin, Klein, and Connell (2005), Mukherji (2005), and Scheepers, Venkitachalam, and 
Gibbs (2004)5 that supported the balanced approach.  
Kumar and Ganesh’s (2011) findings do not provide support for Hansen et al.’s (1999) warning 
against having a balanced strategy: 
“[…] in other words, units with a stronger leaning towards personalization did not 
necessarily do better than those with a more balanced strategy, as might have been 
expected from the propositions of Hansen et al. (1999) that firms which adopt an 80-
20 mix of the two strategies will perform better than those that have a near equal mix. 
In sum, no clear pattern relating with strategy balance with performance was 
observable.” (Kumar and Ganesh, 2011 :130). 
Despite the indeterminate nature of the findings above, Kumar and Ganesh (2011) go on to 
note that:  
“[…] if a firm’s overall strategic agenda is such that it needs both the benefits derived 
both from the reuse of explicit knowledge, as well as the generation and dissemination 
of employees’ tacit knowledge in good measure, then balancing the two strategies 
may be the right thing to do.” Kumar and Ganesh (2011: 130) 
As such, Kumar and Ganesh (2011) are in agreement with the authors discussed so far in this 
section that Hansen et al.’s (1999) warning against a balanced approach to codification/ 
                                                        
4 Haesli, A. and Boxall, P. (2005). ‘When knowledge management meets HR strategy: an exploration of 
personalization-retention and codification-recruitment configurations’. International Journal of Human 
Resource Management, Vol. 16 No. 11, pp. 1955-75. 
5 Scheepers et al. (2004) is discussed in more detail below, the full citation is contained in the References at the 
end of this document.  
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personalization is unfounded and that a balanced approach may, in fact, present a desirable 
alternative.  
 Scheepers, Venkitachalam and Gibbs (2004) 
Scheepers et al. (2004) assessed Hansen et al.’s (1999) argument about the 80-20 strategy 
mix across four case-study organizations, and came to a more nuanced conclusion than the 
other authors covered so far in this section.   
Scheepers et al. (2004) state that they found some support for Hansen et al. (1999) but also 
felt that Hansen et al.’s model needed some refinement, as it could lead to an organization 
locking itself into one strategy. This was illustrated in one of the case organizations they 
investigated: 
“[…] the ineffective knowledge use in this case could be attributed to the lack of 
attention to personalization in support of their (dominant) codification approach. At 
the same time, the case highlights the difficulty that organizations can face in 
implementing the 80/20 knowledge strategy mix advocated by HNT [Hansen, Nohria 
and Tierney].” (Scheepers et al., 2004 :216) 
They concluded that Hansen et al.’s (1999) model was useful for determining an 
organizations initial strategic direction (codification or personalization), but that 
organizations needed the flexibility to evolve their strategy mix over time. Specifically, they 
state: 
“[…] HNT’s advice may be useful during the early stages of strategy development (e.g. 
to prioritize initiatives), but becomes less applicable over time. In fact, we see a risk in 
slavishly following HNT’s 80/20 rule; the organization could fixate on the dominant 
choice and ‘lock’ itself in strategically.” (Scheepers et al., 2004: 217). 
Scheepers et al. are clear that they “do not suggest a ‘wholesale’ rejection of the HNT model” 
(2004:217), and state that it is valuable in helping an organization determine its initial 
knowledge management strategy.  
It is unclear in this case whether Hansen et al.’s (1999) theory is supported by Scheepers et 
al. (2004), or whether Scheepers et al. is seeking support from Hansen et al. The rejection of 
any exceptions was fundamental to the theoretical value of Hansen et al.’s model. Scheepers 
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et al.’s (2004) refinements are of great value, but essentially disregard Hansen et al.’s 
landmark statement of “do not straddle” (Hansen et al., 1999:112). Therefore, the position 
taken by this thesis is that Scheepers et al. (2004) has taken issue with the same aspect of 
Hansen et al.’s theory as the other authors in this section - that is to say, Scheepers et al. do 
not support the “no straddling” rule and the mandated 80-20 mix.  
2.3 Conclusion on papers raising critiques of Hansen et al. 
From the papers reviewed above it can be seen that while Hansen et al.’s (1999) theory may 
be seen as a pioneering piece of work (Liu et al., 2013: 757), there are subsequent analyses 
that disagree with its claims and underlying assumptions about knowledge management. 
While there is consensus among the dissenting authors discussed above that Hansen et al.’s 
(1999) statement that knowledge management strategy needs to align with business strategy 
is correct, the most contentious issue is Hansen et al.’s prediction that codification and 
personalization can only coexist in a roughly 80-20 split, without risking organizational failure. 
The authors above disagree and argue that this is not supported by empirical evidence. It has 
been observed that, contrary to Hansen et al.’s predictions, straddling both codification and 
personalization will not automatically lead to failure, and that strategies could feasibly co-
exist in ratios other than the 80-20 split. Even Scheepers et al.’s (2004) attempts to support 
Hansen et al.’s theory through refinements theory require that the prohibition on straddling 
and the mandated 80-20 mix ultimately be abandoned.  
These studies undermine Hansen et al.’s (1999) implicit assumption about the nature of 
codification and personalization, that these two approaches exist in opposition to one 
another. By showing that they can coexist the authors above show that they may in fact be 
complementary, which is a fundamentally different way of looking at these two components 
parts of the knowledge management paradigm.   
2.4 Subsequent work by members of Hansen et al.’s authors 
A subsequent paper by Hansen and Nørbjerg (2005) presents a case study of some of the 
difficulties encountered by software development companies trying to decide on codification 
versus personalization strategies. This is a useful paper because it shows Hansen et al.’s 
(1999) theory being applied by one of the original team members, which provides an 
opportunity to clarify potentially contentious points from the original paper. It is also six years 
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after the original paper, by which stage the criticisms of Koenig (2001) and Scheepers et al. 
(2004) have also been published, and are therefore available for rebuttal.  
While Hansen et al. (1999) did not provide a definition of “knowledge management” in their 
paper. However, this subsequent paper by Hansen and Nørbjerg (2005) cite Quinitas et al. 
(1997) to provide a definition of knowledge management as: 
“[…] the task of developing and maintaining organizational processes or practices to 
create, acquire, capture, share and use knowledge wherever it resides to enhance 
learning and performance in organizations including the creation of environments in 
which learning and knowledge exchange can take place.” 
Recognizing organizational processes or practices as things that can capture knowledge is 
something new, not previously acknowledged under Hansen et al. (1999). Organizational 
learning features prominently in this definition, and Hansen and Nørbjerg (2005) follow this 
with a discussion of individual learning and organizational learning. This leads one to expect 
that the views of Hansen and Nørbjerg (2005) will differ from those of Hansen et al. (1999), 
in that Hansen’s (2005) view has been updated to recognize the role of the organization and 
move on from Hansen et al.’s (1999) structural perspective.   
However, Hansen and Nørbjerg (2005) go on to base their paper on the unaltered concepts 
of codification and personalization that were established in Hansen et al. (1999). In the 
subsequent discussion of the codification and personalization concepts, Hansen and Nørbjerg 
(2005) are clear that under a personalization strategy: “The organizational memory is based 
on its individuals [my emphasis], and information technology is used primarily as a means to 
locate knowledgeable people and enable direct communication.”  
Hansen and Nørbjerg’s (2005) statement that organizational memory is based on the memory 
of individuals is a contradiction in terms. Hansen and Nørbjerg (2005) abandon their reference 
to processes, procedures and shared practices as potential holders of organizational 
knowledge, retreating back to the structuralist perspective that maintains the emphasis on 
the individual as the holder of knowledge. This is because under the epistemology of 
possession that underlies the structural perspective: 
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“… knowledge is seen as a possession of the human mind, and treated as a mental (or 
cognitive) capacity, or resource, that can be developed, applied and used to improve 
effectiveness in the workplace.” (Newell et al. 2009: 3). 
Hansen and Nørbjerg (2005) are unable to concede that knowledge held for the purposes of 
innovation can reside anywhere by in a human mind. By focusing on the individual, Hansen 
and Nørbjerg (2005) disregard the idea of the ‘collective mind’ of the organization. The 
obvious drawback of this is that if your organization grows, you will need a lot of individuals 
to hold all the knowledge, leading Hansen and Nørbjerg (2005) and go on, in the same 
paragraph, to note that:  
“The main drawback of this [personalization] strategy is that it is not very effective in 
situations where specialized solutions are not needed and also it does not scale as well 
as the codification strategy – e.g., certain people in the organization easily become 
bottlenecks.” (2005: 3).  
This shows that Hansen and Nørbjerg (2005) maintain Hansen et al.’s (1999) view that 
personalization is the appropriate strategy for innovation, and that due to the emphasis on 
the individual being the store of knowledge this will present difficulties in a large organization 
(which promises to problems for reconciling this theory with an organization like NASA that 
is both large and innovative).   
By the end of the paper, Hansen and Nørbjerg’s (2005) state that neither strategy was able to 
satisfy all the members of the software development companies that were investigated, and 
that while the framework was able to guide organizations to a limited extent in choosing their 
knowledge management strategy, they conclude: 
“The framework is too simple to be able to comprehend the complexity of a modern 
(software) organization since the knowledge management strategy needed might be 
different depending on the organizational level in the organization. This said the 
framework might be provide a good rule-of-thumb in explaining what the necessary 
means on a specific organization level might be, and to point management in the right 
direction.”  
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This conclusion by Hansen and Nørbjerg (2005) seems to start to recognize the contention 
raised by the other authors above, that a more balanced strategy is needed. However, by the 
end of the paper it can be seen that Hansen and Nørbjerg (2005) have not done much to alter 
Hansen et al.’s (1999) theory beyond an attempt at incorporating organizational learning into 
the theory, that in the end proved incompatible with their structural perspective.  
Like Hansen et al. (1999), Hansen and Nørbjerg (2005) maintain that personalization is the 
strategy required for innovation.  Hansen and Nørbjerg (2005: 3) also state that 
personalization will not scale as well as codification. Therefore, it can be expected when it 
comes to a large organization that innovates on a daily basis, some fundamental 
disagreements with Hansen et al.’s (1999) theory will inevitably arise. 
2.5 Conclusion on gaining some perspective on Hansen et al.  
This chapter reviewed available publications in order to determine what conceptual 
perspective Hansen et al. (1999) is taking on knowledge, consider what other authors had to 
say about Hansen et al.’s theory, and determine if work by one of the original authors of the 
Hansen et al. paper provides further insights into the theory.  
It was found that Hansen et al. (1999) are taking a conceptual view of knowledge consistent 
with the epistemology of possession and the Structural perspective. This view sees knowledge 
as being closer to information than subsequent views do, in that it can be possessed, 
accumulated and transferred. As a result, it can be held as codified knowledge in rule-sets 
and as personalized knowledge in the heads of experts. The organization, communities of 
practice and knowledge held in organizational processes/practices does are not 
acknowledged in this perspective, and the organization is merely seen as the sum of its parts.  
That Hansen et al. (1999) takes this view means that insofar as innovation is concerned, it 
cannot come from codified knowledge (rule-sets) and they are ignoring the role of the 
organization. Hansen et al.’s view is that innovation has to be the product of an individual 
human mind. This presents problems for acknowledging communities of practice, or the role 
of knowledge embedded in organizational processes and procedures, and means that if the 
innovative organization wants to grow, it needs more individual experts.  
Reviewing other authors showed that they all agreed with Hansen et al. (1999) that 
knowledge management practices need to align with an organization’s competitive strategy, 
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but they all criticized Hansen et al.’s assertion that codification and personalization strategies 
could not be practiced in a more balanced mix than an 80-20 split.  
A subsequent paper by Hansen and Nørbjerg (2005) applied Hansen et al.’s original theory, 
with the modification that it attempted to account for organizational learning. However, in 
trying to maintain a structural perspective Hansen and Nørbjerg inaccurately attributed 
organizational learning to individual learning, which failed to advance Hansen et al.’s (1999) 
theory. Hansen and Nørbjerg (2005) were forced to concede that Hansen et al.’s (1999) 
framework is too simple and that different strategies may be needed for different parts of an 
organization.  
This chapter shows that the major weakness that is emerging on Hansen et al.’s (1999) theory 
is the statement that codification and personalization cannot coexist in an organization as 
equals and must be practiced in an 80-20 split. This weakness appears to come from Hansen 
et al.’s perception of codification and personalization as being opposites that exist in tension 
with one another, rather than as complementary tools, and Hansen et al.’s continued 
adherence to an outdated epistemology of possession/structural perspective that places too 
much emphasis on individual expertise at the expense of recognizing the role of the 
organization.  
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3. Case Analysis: Knowedge Management Strategy at NASA 
As discussed under methodology, this section will review NASA’s activities as an organization 
through four sections, in line with the key characteristics of organizations identified by 
Hansen et al. (1999). These sections are (i) competitive strategy and knowledge economics, 
(ii) knowledge management strategy, (iii) approach to human resources management, and 
(iv) investment in I.T. 
Each section will identify NASA as either approximating the characteristics of an organization 
that according to Hansen et al. (1999) should rely on codification, an organization that relies 
on personalization, or potentially approximating both categories. This section will provide the 
material for chapter 4 (Discussion), wherein it will be decided if NASA fits mainly into one 
strategy or the other, or if it is attempting to straddle both strategies.  
3.1 Competitive strategy and economic model  
As discussed in section 1.3 (Methodology), determining whether NASA’s competitive strategy 
is geared towards codification or personalization consists of showing whether the 
organization aims to provide high quality and reliable products/services provision with fast 
turnaround and low costs (codification), or customized, innovative products/services 
delivered by channeling individual expertise, resulting in slower turnaround and higher cost, 
but steady growth and a high quality/success ranking (personalization).  
Determining NASA’s knowledge-economics model consists of distinguishing whether NASA 
engages in reuse economics (codification) or expert economics (personalization). In this 
context, reuse economics means investing once in a knowledge asset and reusing many times 
and large teams with high ratio of juniors to seniors. (It is of interest to note here that Hansen 
et al. (1999) do not acknowledge the need to keep investing in a knowledge asset to keep it 
up-to-date; this is an activity that would need to be undertaken by staff that were highly-
qualified in that field, as it could not just be done by graduate-level implementors).  Expert 
economics means highly-customized solutions to unique problems and small teams with a 
low ratio of juniors to seniors. 
Since NASA is a federally-funded government agency, revenues and market share are not 
applicable measures here. However, the remaining factors in the descriptions above can be 
resolved to the following scorecard: 
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Table 4 Competitive and knowledge-economics strategy scorecard 
Codification Personalization 
High quality and reliable products/services 
provision with fast turnaround and low 
costs. 
Customized, innovative products/services 
delivered by channeling individual expertise. 
Reuse: investing once in a knowledge asset 
and reusing many times. 
Expert economics: highly-customized 
solutions to unique problems. 
Large teams with high ratio of juniors to 
seniors. 
Small teams with a low ratio of juniors to 
seniors. 
 Competitive strategy 
As noted in section 1.4 (NASA – a good test case for Hansen et al.’s theory), NASA’s Vision, 
Mission and Strategic objectives (which will not be repeated here) include statements like 
“expand human knowledge through new scientific discoveries” and “extend continuous 
human presence deeper into space and to the moon”. This clearly points to a focus on 
customized, innovative products/services that is characteristic of personalization.  
The competitive strategy under codification hinges on “fast turnaround and low costs”. The 
only time that NASA ever came close to trying this was in the 1990’s during the Faster-Better-
Cheaper initiative, where:   
“the goal was to drastically reduce project costs while speeding development times. 
Development was indeed faster, and missions were indeed cheaper—but the approach 
was flawed, as the doomed 1999 missions suggest.” (MacCormack, 2004). 
The failure of two Mars missions within 3 months of each other resulted in criticism for the 
Faster-Better-Cheaper initiative that have ultimately seen management practices (and 
knowledge management practices) move on from this paradigm. Given the size and duration 
of NASA projects, “fast turnaround and low costs” is simply not an accurate description for an 
organization that consumed 0.47% (USD 19,509 MN) of the federal budget of the United 
States of America in 2017 (‘Budget of NASA’, 2018).  
Therefore, it seems that NASA’s competitive strategy puts it in the category of what Hansen 
et al. (1999) would consider appropriate for organizations practicing a personalization 
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knowledge management strategy. However, therein lies the problem, as Hansen et al.’s 
conditions rely on this innovative and customized product being delivered by “channeling 
individual expertise”. As will be shown below, does not sound like a feasible description of 
NASA’s projects where teams run into the hundreds of members as projects of enormous 
scale conscript so many departments to their cause. The following quote would serve well in 
the next two sections covering knowledge reuse and teams at NASA, but it is presented here 
to illustrate how NASA has an emphasis on teams over Hansen et al.’s channeling of individual 
expertise. 
“Because each project team has a different assignment and a different mission, people 
tended to think, ‘We never do the same thing twice. Lessons don’t apply since the 
mission is always unique.’ But what we do over and over is put together a team to 
accomplish a mission. So that suggested what the knowledge management focus 
should be.” (Rogers, 2013: 22). 
Therefore, although NASA is not pursuing Faster-Better-Cheaper the classification of NASA as 
having a competitive strategy based on Hansen et al.’s (1999) definition of personalization 
would depend solely on its characteristic of innovation and not its characteristic of channeling 
individual expertise, and so is questionable at best.  
 Knowledge-economics at NASA 
Again, ignoring statements about revenue effects, this question focuses on the extent to 
which NASA potentially reuses knowledge, whether NASA relies on highly customized 
solutions delivered by experts, and also whether it uses large teams full of juniors or small 
teams full of experts.  
Reuse of knowledge at NASA 
In chapter 2 (Theory) a paper by Kumar and Ganesh (2011) disagreed with Hansen et al. (1999) 
and noted that a balanced to knowledge management strategies may be desirable. During 
their paper they also cited a paper by Iyer, Jayanti, Lou, Kalyanaraman and Ramani (2005) 
wherein it is “[…] estimated that more than 75 percent of engineering design activity 
comprises of reuse of previous design knowledge to address new design problems.”  
Therefore, it would seem that as far as engineering is concerned there is scope for significant 
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knowledge reuse and given that NASA relies heavily on engineering of all types, this should 
be borne in mind. 
This point is explicitly made by the CKO of JPL, David Oberhettinger - noted by Prusak and 
Schwartz’s (2016)  to be a key contributor to the overall KM strategy for NASA - when he 
states in JPL’s Knowledge Management Strategy: “’Knowledge husbandry’ can save JPL time 
and money if it enables key knowledge to be reused on future projects” (Oberhettinger, 2014: 
5). He reiterates this point in an online post entitled “Why Manage Knowledge?” on the JPL 
website: 
“The JPL KM program will seek opportunities for JPL to reuse costly knowledge that is 
not presently captured for reuse. Knowledge that can be shown to be of high value to 
future projects and at risk for loss will be targeted for capture and sharing.” 
(Oberhettinger, Undated). 
Knowledge reuse is clearly a priority for JPL, as Oberhettinger raises it again in an interview in 
2013 when he states: 
“If the project budget does not provide adequate resources for archiving project-
specific knowledge for easy retrieval, then it may impact our ability to reuse technology 
developed at great expense. […] It creates a situation where JPL doesn’t know what 
JPL knows! For example, it was unfortunate that JPL design of the throttled engine 
needed for the Descent Stage on Mars Science Laboratory necessitated making 
inquiries to Viking project staff who had long since retired.” (CKO News Staff, 2013). 
Edward Rogers (the CKO at Goddard Space Flight Center) and Mike Ryschkewitsch (NASA’s 
Chief Engineer) produced a NASA internal discussion document in 2008 entitled “Knowledge 
Reapplication: Enhancing Organization Learning at NASA” wherein they take a close look at 
this exact issue. Note that in this context reapplication is synonymous with reuse. 
Rogers and Ryschkewitsch (2008) describe how the knowledge reapplication model used by 
NASA relies on personal experience, personal networks, and common knowledge (typically 
kept in a repository).  
Rogers and Ryschkewitsch (2008) note how personal experience can be enhanced through 
job rotations or participating on diverse projects and missions. Personal networks are also 
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enhanced in this way, as well as through workshops, communities of practice, and other 
similar events. Common knowledge is often kept in repositories like libraries and databases, 
as well as in the standardized training. 
They further note how the three systems are interrelated. For example: (i)  someone who 
does not know something (personal experience) may know someone who does (personal 
network), or be able to look it up in the repository (common knowledge), or (ii) the repository 
(common knowledge) may point you to a person (with personal experience) who you didn’t 
know (now added to your personal network). Therefore, these systems function most 
effectively when they are used to enable each other, and the authors state that staff “[…] 
should enhance their ability to learn from all three paths in an integrated fashion.” (Rogers 
and Ryschkewitsch, 2008: 5). 
Rogers and Ryschkewitsch (2008) also highlight that it is when unrealistic expectations are 
placed on one system as the primary learning vehicle that disappointment follows. For 
example, (i) expecting too much technical detail from a personal contact may lead to 
disappoint unless your contact can point you to a document in the repository, or (ii) 
documents from the repository may lack context without a personal contact to fill in the 
background information for you.  
This is important because in pointing out how no single system should be the primary system 
it shows Rogers and Ryschkewitsch (2008) taking a polar opposite view to Hansen et al. (1999) 
who make the firm statement “do not straddle” (1999: 112) and advocate focusing on a 
primary system. 
Furthermore, Rogers and Ryschkewitsch (2008) take the position that learning and knowledge 
reuse is predominantly an interpersonal activity. This is reflected in the following statement: 
“The NASA learning model is useful because it points to where intervention can help. 
Specifically, there are six intervention points that can enhance organization learning 
at NASA: 1) effective job rotation, 2) personal reflection6, 3) knowledge sharing forums, 
4) common core communities, 5) case-based training and 6) lessons learned. Each of 
these can be thought of as an organizational practice that individually may not seem 
                                                        
6 This point is about staff members taking time during projects to identify and consolidate possible lessons.  
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tremendously effective but when combined add up to a powerful learning energy for 
the organization.” Rogers and Ryschkewitsch (2008: 6) 
From the above six activities, the first four rely mainly on interpersonal transfer, while the 
last two (training and lessons-learned) have the potential for systematic/I.T. applications. This 
shows that knowledge managers at NASA are fully aware of the value of personalization and 
incorporate it into their strategies. This is reinforced elsewhere in the same document where 
Rogers and Ryschkewitsch (2008) state: 
“The key to managing knowledge is not necessarily to extract it from its origins but to 
facilitate its use both at the source and within communities across the organization. 
[…] Centralizing knowledge repositories for IT efficiencies may decrease knowledge 
utilization rates by reducing relevance, access and context all of which help knowledge 
flow to new challenges.” Rogers and Ryschkewitsch (2008: 7) 
This shows that NASA is also aware of the weaknesses implicit in trying to extract ‘knowledge’ 
from the workforce and codify it in a system. Instead, they take the position that knowledge 
reuse can be enhanced through personalization. This is incompatible with Hansen et al. 
(1999), who sees knowledge reuse as fundamental to codification and not to personalization. 
As such, the perspective put forward by Rogers and Ryschkewitsch (2008) don’t fit under 
either the codification or personalization approaches.  
Therefore, overall it can be seen that NASA has positive statements about knowledge reuse 
from many reputable sources, and it is also evident that at NASA knowledge reuse is seen as 
an activity rooted in both personalization (personal knowledge and networks) and 
codification (common knowledge). Therefore, with respect to knowledge reuse versus expert 
economics, NASA appears to have foot in both codification and personalization camps.  
Team composition 
The next question is how NASA designs its teams. Does it use large teams of junior 
“implementors” or small teams of experts? Again, in the context of NASA the answer does 
not readily identify with one or the other.  
Hansen et al. (1999: 109) discuss how under a codification strategy relying on reuse 
economics one should use large teams with a high ratio of less experienced “implementors” 
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relative to experienced staff; under a personalization strategy that relies on expert 
economics, one should use a small team comprised mainly of experts. Essentially, this can be 
boiled down to “large team – few experts” or “small team – many experts”. 
In an article entitled “Good Team Design” by NASA’s Chief Knowledge Officer, Edward 
Hoffman, published in NASA’s APPEL Magazine, he discusses some of the elements that he 
perceives as important in teams. His perspective on team composition is relevant here insofar 
as it disagrees with Hansen et al.’s perception of ideal team composition under codification 
versus personalization strategies.  
Hoffman (2009: 1) describes how “Sitting in on the Shuttle Flight Readiness Review, I saw 
many of the factors that go into good team design in action” and describes how: 
“The Shuttle Flight Readiness Review goes against the literature that advises 
minimizing the number of people on a team. There are more than one hundred people 
in the room, all of whom contribute at different points. The size of the team reflects 
the range of technical expertise needed and the interdependence of the systems they 
understand.” (Hoffman, 2009: 1). 
It may be argued that such a large assembly of participants will still require a leader that takes 
an overarching view of the process, however, Hoffman (2009) notes that “[…] there are 
several leaders of the review process […]” and that “[…] sheer number of experts present 
provide[s] the diversity of ideas essential to the complex, interdependent issues involved 
[…]”. 
These observations show that the CKO of NASA does not share Hoffman et al.’s perceptions 
concerning ideal team composition. In terms of team composition, using this example and 
the high praise reserved for it by the NASA CKO, it is not possible to fit NASA’s “large team – 
many experts” under Hansen et al.’s (1999) categories of “large team – few experts” or “small 
team – many experts”. Therefore, as for reuse economics or expert economics, NASA is 
unable to fit into the categories provided by Hansen et al.’s (1999) theory but rather presents 
a hybrid of each.  
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 Conclusion of competitive strategy and knowledge economics at NASA 
It is clear from this section that in terms of competitive strategy and knowledge economics, 
NASA contradicts Hansen et al.’s (1999) descriptions of codification and personalization by 
delivering innovation through its project teams (rather than through individual experts), 
reusing knowledge through a combination of codification and personalization, and by having 
large teams comprised of experts. While there are clearly significant elements of codification 
and personalization present, it is not possible to identify a dominant strategy and so in this 
respect NASA must be said to be following a balanced strategy, or as Hansen et al. would term 
it, straddling.  
3.2 Knowledge management strategy 
This section will look at NASA’s knowledge management strategy from a number of different 
perspectives and constitutes a major part of the analysis. It is divided into four sections that 
will examine: 
1. NASA’s knowledge management journey – This is a review of the events since the mid-
1980’s that have helped to shape NASA’s approach to knowledge management. By 
showing what NASA has tried and subsequently abandoned, it is possible to see the 
contrasts between what went before and what is new about the current approach.  
2. The agency-level knowledge management strategy – This shows the perspective on 
knowledge management taken by the chief knowledge officer at the central agency 
level, which will influence how knowledge management is practiced at the various 
centers and departments.  
3. Knowledge management at the centers – The NASA centers and departments are 
allowed a lot of autonomy in their respective approaches to knowledge management. 
Therefore, it is necessary to investigate the extent to which the agency-level 
knowledge management strategy reflected at the centers.  
4. NASA’s knowledge map – NASA’s main knowledge management tool is its knowledge 
map. This part of the analysis will investigate what the knowledge map can show 
about knowledge management practices at NASA and how they conform to Hansen 
et al.’s theory.  
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 NASA’s knowledge management journey  
To understand NASA’s perspective on knowledge management at the agency level, it is 
necessary to briefly review the sequence of events and factors that helped to shape, and in 
some cases explicitly directed, NASA’s knowledge management strategy. The value of this is 
that when reviewing sources, it is important to be able to identify the era from which they 
originate, as they may have subsequently been replaced by different thinking.  
Hoffman and Boyle (2013) authored a useful paper entitled “Tapping Agency Culture to 
Advance Knowledge Services at NASA” that provides a brief overview of the key milestones 
in the evolution of NASA’s knowledge management activities. This paper is extensively 
referenced in this section, augmented with Regulatory Reports and additional sources to 
provide a more detailed discussion of how NASA’s approach to knowledge management has 
experienced significant changes over time.  
A tradition of mentoring 
Hoffman and Boyle (2013: 23-24) describe how NASA’s model for staff are development 
during had traditionally relied on mentoring its staff through large scale, long duration 
projects. The scale and timeframe of these projects made it logical to develop its staff through 
a “natural progression of learning in a more deliberate and hierarchical context.” They state 
that:  
“NASA leadership implicitly understood that the training curriculum represented 
perhaps 10 percent of the preparation necessary to produce a successful generation of 
project professionals. The bulk of preparation resided in two critical sources—the sheer 
amount of time and duration to gain professional experience in the real world of 
projects, and the unstated but essential reliance on a previous generation of project 
talent who would naturally serve as mentors, coaches, and experts.” Hoffman and 
Boyle (2013:  24) 
This is clearly a case of what Hansen et al. (1999) would consider knowledge transfer through 
personalization. However, when the Space Shuttle Challenger exploded on liftoff in 1986, it 
forced NASA to concede that it was not infallible, and compelled it to rethink its approach to 
project management, culminating in the Faster-Better-Cheaper initiative.  
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
46 
 
The era of Faster-Better-Cheaper (FBC) 
Subsequent to the Challenger disaster NASA adopted the Faster-Better-Cheaper (FBC) 
initiative. FBC at NASA was summarised in the United States General Accounting Office (GAO) 
Report as follows:  
“In 1992 NASA adopted the FBC philosophy as a way of managing programs and 
projects. An important element of this approach was a reduction in NASA headquarters 
management and moving more program responsibility to NASA’s centers. This 
philosophy also increased the demand for program and project managers at a time 
when NASA was experiencing a significant reduction in staff due to retirements, 
downsizing, and departures to industry. Prior to FBC, there were fewer missions, and 
program and project managers accumulated significant first-hand experience before 
managing a program. Under FBC, with a threefold increase in projects and fewer staff, 
this was not always the case. Relatively unseasoned managers who were challenged 
to be more efficient and innovative and to take greater risks in designing and 
implementing missions led many projects.” (GAO Report, 2002: 8). 
Part of the reorganization that took place under FBC was the inception of the Program and 
Project Management Initiative (PPMI). This was characterized by ‘competency-driven project 
management’ that manifested in formal career development paths linking project 
competencies to learning and education directed at an Agency level. Over subsequent years 
the PPMI ultimately evolved into NASA Academy of Program, Project and Engineering 
Leadership (NASA APPEL) (Hoffman and Boyle, 2013: 24). The end result was that “Challenger 
led to individual preparation becoming systematized, codified, and improved” (Hoffman and 
Boyle, 2014: 52). 
The Lessons Learned Information System (LLIS) was also established at this time, in 1995. The 
LLIS is the official agency repository for Lessons Learned. Lessons learned are written up and 
submitted from across NASA, where they are screened for relevance and to ensure that they 
do not contain sensitive or proprietary information. A final review is undertaken by the Office 
of Safety and Mission Assurance, after which the Lesson is entered into the database and 
available for referencing by other project managers and staff.  
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The NASA Procedures and Guidelines for Program and Project Management Processes and 
Requirements (NPG 7120.5A) requires that program and project managers review and apply 
significant lessons learned from the past throughout the program or project life cycle (GAO 
Report, 2002: 19). However, this was not always the case. A 2001 survey that found only a 
quarter of managers at NASA were actively contributing to the LLIS system, with a similar 
number of managers “unaware the system even existed” (MacCormack, 2004). 
However, in 1999 two Mars missions failed in close succession. The Mars Climate Orbiter 
burned up entering the Martian atmosphere because the navigation software incorrectly 
used English instead of metric units, thereby computing the incorrect trajectory. Three 
months later the Mars Polar Lander was lost during a landing attempt – subsequent 
investigations suspect due to premature shutdown of the Lander’s descent engines (GAO, 
2002: 9). 
General Accounting Office Report (2002) 
The Mars mission failures prompted investigation by GAO, and in January 2002, the GAO 
produced a report entitled “NASA – Better Mechanisms Needed for Sharing Lessons Learned”. 
The GAO attributed the failures to the Faster-Better-Cheaper initiative and raised concerns 
that lessons learned from past mishaps and programs were not being applied effectively 
toward future mission success (GAO, 2002: 10). In the reports the GAO stated that:  
“The limitations in NASA’s ability to share lessons learned point toward two underlying 
problems: cultural resistance to sharing knowledge and the lack of an effective 
strategic framework and management attention for overcoming such resistance.” 
(GAO, 2002: 36). 
NASA’s Strategic Plan for Knowledge Management (2002) 
In response to the GAO Report, the “NASA Knowledge Management Team” (a collection of 
NASA managers that preceded the appointment of the agency-level chief knowledge officer) 
produced the Strategic Plan for Knowledge Management in April 2002 (see references). 
However, it appears that this plan failed to have the desired effect. In a document entitled 
“Building the Goddard Learning Organization” (2011) by Goddard Space Flight Center CKO Dr 
Edward Rogers, he describes how:  
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“Unfortunately, that document [the 2002 NASA Strategic Plan for Knowledge 
Management] fell short of achieving effective change and remains in a draft form. In 
contrast, this Goddard Plan is designed to overcome the previous focus on IT as a KM 
driver and an over-emphasis on capturing knowledge from workers for the 
organization as opposed to facilitating knowledge sharing among workers.” (Rogers, 
2011: 5). 
The last statement is significant as it points to the NASA’s KM emphasis in the early 2000’s 
had been on capturing and codifying knowledge rather than encouraging sharing between 
workers. However, Rogers (2011) notes that an increased appreciation of the role of 
knowledge sharing (a personalization approach) followed in the next few years. However, for 
this to happen there had to be a catalyst.  
Columbia Accident Investigation Report (CAIB) 2003 
NASA was busy reviewing its approach to knowledge management and renewing its emphasis 
on knowledge capture when in 2003 disaster struck again when the Space Shuttle Columbia 
disintegrated on re-entry.  
The CAIB Report (2003) identified a number of factors, ranging from technical causes to 
organizational causes. Suffice to say that the problem stemmed from the fact that when 
damage to the space shuttle was observed, the decision to continue with the mission was not 
based on robust engineering data and safety practices, but rather on a consensus based on 
“well it hasn’t caused a problem before” (technically termed a ‘normalization of deviance’) 
that was able to persist through a series of poor communications.  
In terms of what the CAIB Report had to say about practices relating to knowledge 
management, it was specific in pointing out the LLIS system and the known issues with its 
underutilization in the statement: 
“The Lessons Learned Information System database is a much simpler system to use, 
and it can assist with hazard identification and risk assessment. However, personnel 
familiar with the Lessons Learned Information System indicate that design engineers 
and mission assurance personnel use it only on an ad hoc basis, thereby limiting its 
utility. The Board is not the first to note such deficiencies. Numerous reports, including 
most recently a General Accounting Office 2001 report, highlighted fundamental 
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weaknesses in the collection and sharing of lessons learned by program and project 
managers.” (CAIB Report, 2003:189). 
In the end, the Columbia Accident Investigation Board (CAIB) concluded, among many other 
shortcomings, that NASA “[…] has not demonstrated the characteristics of a learning 
organization.” (CAIB Report, 2003:12). Hoffman and Boyle (2013) explain how this resulted in 
renewed efforts from knowledge services at the agency, which took the form of printed 
media, a variety of forums served by communities of practice both within and outside the 
agency, and a concerted effort to capturing and sharing knowledge through lessons-learned 
(Hoffman & Boyle, 2013: 24). 
This shows how NASA did not move away from the paradigm of ‘capturing knowledge’, but 
sought to complement it with a greater emphasis on sharing. However, the desire to increase 
sharing faced other challenges, as it occurred: 
“[…] at a time when experience and talent is at a premium to achieve mission success, 
NASA’s workforce is increasingly young and inexperienced, and many of the most 
experienced project managers are preparing to retire. This speed of change has 
catapulted NASA and other organizations to respond to new challenges through rapid 
technological innovation, increased interdependence on alliances and partnering, and 
innovative approaches to capture and channel knowledge.”  Hoffman & Boyle (2013: 
25) 
Therefore, faced with the urgent need to increase sharing in an organization that was large, 
geographically spread, and facing the imminent retirement of much of its knowledge, it was 
necessary to leverage technology as well as social means. This shows the start of recognizing 
that a more balanced strategy is needed. 
NASA Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel (ASAP) 2011 
In 2011 the Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel (ASAP) submitted its Annual Report to the U.S. 
Congress in which reports on what it has observed at NASA with respect to operations, 
decision-making processes, safety culture and other strategic topics.  
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
50 
 
While the ASAP Report (NASA Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel, 2012) specifically 
complimented the staff at Johnson Space Center and Goddard Space Flight Center for their 
good work in cataloging and managing NASA critical knowledge, it went on to note that:  
“These examples, while excellent and laudable, do not constitute an approach that 
ensures the identification and capture of critical NASA implicit and explicit knowledge 
Agency-wide in a manner that would allow any NASA employee (or, under some 
circumstances, NASA partners and contractors) a single process or tool to locate and 
then access all of the information resources.” (NASA Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel, 
2012: 12). 
The ASAP Report then made a specific recommendation that was a defining moment for 
knowledge management at NASA:  
“The ASAP has recommended that NASA establish a single focal point—a “Chief 
Knowledge Officer”— within the Agency to develop the policy and requirements 
necessary to integrate knowledge capture across programs, projects, and Centers. 
Additionally, the ASAP has recommended that NASA consider establishing Chief 
Knowledge Officer positions at all NASA Centers and in all Mission Directorates to 
ensure standardization of programs and lessons learned as we move forward.” (ASAP 
Report, 2011: 12) 
NASA responded to this by appointing Dr Edward Hoffman as its first agency-level CKO in 
2012.  Hoffman and Boyle (2013: 26) describe how the Chief Knowledge Officer (CKO) was to 
act as a facilitator and champion for agency knowledge services, supported by designated 
CKOs at each center and mission directorate. This federated approach enabled knowledge 
management efforts to adapt to the requirements and cultural characteristics of each center 
and mission directorate. 
Hoffman’s influence introduced some changes to the emphasis of knowledge management 
as it was practiced at NASA. With reference to the existing draft Strategic Plan for Knowledge 
Management (2002), Hoffman and Boyle (2013) note:  
“At the beginning of redefining the strategy and framework, NASA’s existing 
knowledge policy was limited to a singular focus on lessons learned and the proprietary 
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Lessons Learned Information System (LLIS) database, despite the fact that the 
organization had greatly expanded its knowledge activities over the past several years 
to include a wider array of services. This clearly established the need for a new 
knowledge policy that reflected the breadth of independent knowledge services now 
in use across the agency. This federated approach resulted in a natural progression to 
identify, characterize, and define agency knowledge services into a knowledge map 
[…]. The map helps all practitioners to achieve mission success. It is updated quarterly 
and briefed to senior NASA leadership.” Hoffman & Boyle (2013: 26). 
Hoffman and Boyle’s (2013) paper concludes with a section entitled ‘The Future of Knowledge 
Services’ where they state that:  “Knowledge services imply an active exchange of wisdom and lessons through access to both 
people and technology. Often there can be a contest between technology and people 
approaches, but an optimal balance of both is necessary.” Hoffman and Boyle (2013: 26) 
This final quote shows that NASA’s chief knowledge officer is well aware of the tension that 
can exist between the I.T. driven aspects of knowledge management (typically characteristic 
of codification) and the personalization aspects, but believes that these two aspects can work 
synergistically. This is a strong indication that NASA’s knowledge management leaders are in 
favour of a balanced approach.    
Conclusion on NASA’s knowledge management journey 
This section provided some context as to how NASA has evolved it knowledge management 
activities in response to the events and challenges that have arisen starting the Challenger 
Disaster in the mid-1980’s, and culminating with the appointment of NASA’s first agency-level 
CKO, Dr Edward Hoffman in 2012. 
The sources referenced above show that in 2013 there is already evidence that Hoffman is a 
proponent of an approach to knowledge management that “balances both people and 
technology” rather than focusing on just one strategy as Hansen et al. (1999) recommend. 
This promises to put NASA’s approach to knowledge management at odds with Hansen et 
al.’s theory of how knowledge management should be undertaken.  
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The next section of this chapter will look at Dr Hoffman’s approach directing knowledge 
management at a central level, followed by a section containing a sample of interviews from 
NASA centers, departments and projects to show how knowledge management is being 
handled at a local level.  
 NASA’s central strategy 
In order to get a better idea of NASA’s approach to knowledge management at a central level, 
reference is made to three documents that provide insight into NASA’s central knowledge 
management strategy. While an effort has been made to preserve some context and 
background information, the particular focus on highlighting where they make explicit 
reference to elements that can be construed as representative of codification and 
personalization.  
Working Knowledge at NASA (2013) 
In his presentation entitled ‘Working Knowledge at NASA’, NASA CKO Doctor Edward Hoffman 
notes that because of the complex nature of knowledge at NASA, the agency has opted for a 
federated model for coordination and collaboration of knowledge interests. He substantiates 
this choice by referring to how many CKOs outside of NASA have tried to “manage” all the 
knowledge in their organizations and failed. This is also referred to in the paper entitled 
“Tapping Agency Culture” by Hoffman & Boyle (2013: 26). Under the federated model, the 
NASA CKO functions as facilitator and champion for knowledge while knowledge managers at 
the individual NASA centers are given space to implement the systems that best suit their 
context (Hoffman, 2013).  
This structure follows on the recommendations by the Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel 
(ASAP), wherein it was recommended that “[…] NASA establish a single focal point (a Chief 
Knowledge Officer [CKO]) within the agency to develop the policy and requirements 
necessary to integrate knowledge capture across programs, projects, and centers.” (Hoffman, 
2012: 1). 
Hoffman highlights that when it comes to finding knowledge, it is “imperative to have a 
network” (2013: 23). Hoffman says that this is because knowledge is social. Hoffman notes 
that NASA’s existing knowledge policy NPR 7120.6 is limited in its singular focus on lessons 
learned and the lessons-learned information system (LLIS), and that because NASA has greatly 
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expanded its knowledge activities (as illustrated on the industry’s Knowledge Map), a new 
knowledge policy is needed that reflects the breadth of knowledge approaches in-use across 
NASA (Hoffman, 2013). 
The significance of this paper is that Hoffman refers to knowledge capture but also to 
knowledge networks (with emphasis on the social aspect of these networks). These are 
elements of codification and personalization, respectively, and show that NASA is taking a 
more balanced view of knowledge management practices.  
K2020 at ARC: One NASA Strategy in a Federated Model (2016) 
In this document, Prusak and Schwartz (2016) are commenting on NASA’s Knowledge 2020 
event, convened by NASA’s CKO Dr Edward Hoffman. The event centered on the challenge of 
creating an agency-wide Knowledge Strategy among a network built on a federated model. 
Regarding the knowledge management approach taken by NASA, Prusak and Schwartz’s 
(2016) noted that: 
“The NASA KM program has many features but can be briefly summarized as 
knowledge acquisition and sharing, focused on knowledge application and 
undergirded by knowledge leadership and management commitment.” (Prusak and 
Schwartz, 2016: 5). 
Prusak and Schwartz (2016) did not go into detail on NASA’s overall KM strategy, but did note 
that “A very important component of NASA’s strategic emphasis is the identification and 
utilization of critical knowledge” (Prusak and Schwartz, 2016: 5). 
This referred to a project undertaken to identify and prioritize critical knowledge, as described 
by the IKNS Capstone Project undertaken by Columbia University and NASA (Bell et al., 2015). 
Prusak and Schwartz (2016) noted how NASA had found that many KM projects failed because 
they were indiscriminate in the knowledge they captured, and operated on the principle of 
“more is better”. The IKNS Capstone Project’s objective was to recommend a method for 
identifying, prioritizing, capturing and transferring critical knowledge. Critical knowledge was 
defined as “broadly applicable lessons learned that enable mission success, stimulate critical 
thinking and help raise questions that need to be addressed at various phases in the project 
life-cycle” (IKNS 2015: 4). This means that among other things, knowledge referees would be 
looking for (i) lessons with broad applicability, (ii) that involved the top 5% of updateable 
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knowledge, (iii) can keep evolving towards new applications and missions, and (iv) that lends 
itself to being incorporated into processes, policies, standards and training to prevent it being 
lost. 
The IKNS Critical Knowledge Project can be seen as a project aimed at codifying critical agency 
knowledge. Its focus was mainly on codification, and while it advocated the distribution of 
critical knowledge through policies/procedures/standards and training, there was a lack of 
personalization elements. 
Prusak and Schwartz (2016) did note how Patrick Johnson, CKO of the Human Exploration and 
Operations (HEO) Mission Directorate, presented on plans made by his team that clearly 
involved the identification and capture of critical knowledge, with an explicit theme devoted 
to enabling and encouraging “good usage by talks, publications, online tools, and internal 
publicity” (Prusak and Schwartz, 2016: 7). This shows elements of codification and 
personalization existing side-by-side in the same Directorate, and shows that NASA is serious 
about capturing and codifying important knowledge, as opposed to just pursuing networks 
(personalization). Again, this is indicative of a more balanced approach to knowledge 
management.  
“Five Questions for Ed Hoffman” (2013) 
This interview undertaken by the APPEL News staff with NASA CKO Dr Hoffman shows that 
Hoffman perceives NASA to have a balance of strategies aimed at ‘capturing’ and ‘sharing’: 
“If you look at our NASA knowledge map you can see we’ve got some excellent work 
going on in terms of capturing case studies, capturing NASA stories. The map also 
shows great work in the area of sharing our lessons, pause and learn activities, and 
learning from reviews. We have face-to-face activities with people coming together to 
share and to learn. I think we are good at having experts who share, and we have 
strong communities of expertise in many different disciplines—we are often leaders in 
that.” 
The initiatives aimed at ‘capturing’ can be seen to relate to codification, while the initiatives 
aimed at ‘sharing’ show instances of ‘personalization’. This is an indication that NASA’s KM 
strategy sees the importance of both. Hoffman places a lot of emphasis on sharing: 
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“[…] the sharing component, to really make sure that we have an organization and 
projects and programs that work off the principle of sharing your expertise, sharing 
your wisdom, sharing your knowledge.” (Hoffman, 2013:1). 
Hoffman also discusses the importance of access to knowledge and wisdom, and shows how 
he sees it as containing a lot of elements of personalization as well as codification: 
“the importance of access—access to knowledge and wisdom. We have created an 
environment where people need to have access to the people to talk to, to training and 
learning, to building their communities of practice, and also to having alliances and 
networks. There is also access through technology such as social media and being able 
to go into the computer and to find what or who you are looking for.” (Hoffman, 
2013:1) 
In contrast to the paper on critical knowledge, in this paper the focus is on personalization.  
Conclusion on NASA’s central strategy 
From the papers presented above it can be seen that while NASA has a strong focus on 
identifying and capturing critical knowledge, there is also an emphasis on the social elements 
such as networks, sharing and people having access to other people. Neither strategy is clearly 
promoted above the other, and it can be concluded based on this that at a central level NASA 
is promoting a knowledge management strategy that attempts to balance codification and 
personalization efforts. This means that at a central level, NASA’s appears to be going against 
Hoffman et al.’s (1999) admonition and is straddling both practices.  
 Knowledge management at NASA centers, departments and projects 
While NASA may at a central level espouse knowledge practices that show a balance between 
codification and personalization, the federated approach taken by NASA with respect to this 
issue leaves the different centers, departments and projects a lot of latitude to exercise their 
own brands of knowledge management.  
This section is intended to determine whether knowledge management practices at these 
organizations reflect the same balance between personalization and codification. It is not 
possible to review all 25 organizations represented on the NASA knowledge management 
map within the space constraints of this dissertation. Therefore, this will be done by reviewing 
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transcripts from interviews with knowledge managers across a mix of nine centers, 
departments and projects, with a particular focus on detecting whether their perspective 
favors a balance between codification and personalization, or is biased in favor of 
emphasizing one approach as per Hansen et al.’s (1999) recommendation. 
Ames Research Center (ARC) 
Mendoza holds that it is of critical importance to capture and organize lessons learned 
because “many things that we do are not new, but a lot of the new things we do are based 
on what we did before.” (‘NASA Ames’ Donald Mendoza’: 2017). This points to knowledge 
reuse being a significant factor for ARC, and this is a characteristic of codification. 
Mendoza also states that with respect to the application of lessons learned at ARC, “for the 
most part the majority of what happens is very, very organic. What I mean by that is it’s all 
people-based.” This now balances the perspective with some personalization. He points out 
how:  
“It’s a very difficult thing to basically refer someone to a giant database and say, ‘Here, 
go and queue the database for lessons on propulsion systems,’ or ‘Here’s a spreadsheet 
that has all the lessons from Mission A. See if any of them are applicable to Mission 
B.’” 
Mendoza shows how personalization needs to be complemented with codification when he 
says “We try to engage the human element as much as possible, but that’s not always possible 
because oftentimes the human is no longer at the agency, so then we turn to the machinery 
of the process.” To formalize this knowledge so that it’s not people dependent, it needs to be 
captures in the Lessons Learned Database. Mendoza is responsible for establishing the 
policies and procedures that ARC uses to capture and disseminate lessons learned, and has 
authored over 400 lessons learned. Mendoza also refers to how lessons are captured at JPL 
and embedded in the centers policies and procedures: 
“At JPL they have a program whereby once a lesson gets processed through their 
machinery, there’s a group of humans who then assess the knowledge or the output 
of the machinery and decide how to fold that into their business as usual. […] When 
they get a lesson, they will assess it for which document needs to be enhanced or 
revised or changed based on that lesson. So rather than having the end user have to 
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go to some specific database to look for a lesson on some part, they’re just doing their 
work. The knowledge is already embedded in the instructions that they’re using.” 
This is an important observation for how learning can be embedded in the organization 
practices, making it into a ‘learning organization’ that transfers knowledge by integrating it 
into policies and procedures to drive reuse, rather than relying on dissemination and adoption 
on an individual basis.  
In the interview Mendoza can be seen to take a view of knowledge management at ARC that 
is balanced between personalization and codification, and has highlighted the importance of 
knowledge reuse for the agency.  
Armstrong Flight Research Center (AFRC) 
An interview with AFRC’s CKO Bradford Neal (‘NASA Armstrong Flight Research Center’s 
Bradford Neal’, 2017) is posted on the NASA APPEL website. During the interview, in answer 
to the question “How does your organization share knowledge?”, Neal’s response is:  
“A lot of the knowledge transfer at Armstrong takes place through human interaction. 
We try to promote the interaction of less experienced folks with more senior folks 
through work assignments and our internal review processes. We also hold occasional 
lunchtime seminars and colloquia to cover topics that we feel are of interest to the 
broader community.” 
This is distinctly about personalization. Neal’s interview also discusses how AFRC collects and 
maintains flight data and project records, collects and disseminates lessons learned, 
encourages its staff to write technical reports, and encourages presentations at technical 
conferences and symposia. Neal highlights the challenge of “allowing people the opportunity 
to slow down long enough to think about what knowledge they have collected, and then how 
they are going to capture and present that in ways that are easily communicated”. This shows 
more emphasis on codification. Neal also discusses importance of understanding the reasons 
underlying processes and procedures at the center, so that staff understand the lessons 
embedded in those organizational practices and can update or replace these organizational 
processes without risking the loss of the organizational learning that went into their creation.  
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This first part of Neal’s interview shows that AFRC has a strong emphasis on activities 
synonymous with personalization. However, there is also evidence of a variety of activities 
aimed at codification and how organizational knowledge are bound up in the centers policies 
and procedures. The end result is that knowledge management at AFRC can be judged to 
involve a combination of both personalization and codification initiatives. 
Marshall Space Flight Center (MSFC) 
In an interview with MSFC CKO Paul McConnaughey (‘NASA Marshall’s Paul McConnaughey’, 
2017), he discusses how knowledge management at MSFC involves knowledge capture, case 
studies and the collection and distilling of lessons learned, as well as their focus on 
communities of practice and communities of interest.   
McConnaughey makes an interesting statement that “in order to check ourselves, we went 
through all the lessons learned from shuttle and Constellation, and measured ourselves in 
respect to what we were or were not doing to follow lessons learned from those two 
programs. Those were the nearest ones. One was very successful and they chose to flow it 
into policy.” 
This echoes the observation by Mendoza at Ames Research Center, when he described how 
JPL embeds lessons learned into the centers’ policies and procedures to make a ‘learning 
organization’, and Neal from Armstrong Flight Research Center who insisted that the reasons 
underlying organizational practices needs to be understood so that key lessons can be 
preserved. Therefore, MSFC shows a commitment to codification as well as elements of 
personalization from the cultivation of communities of practice.  
Johnson Space Center (JSC) 
An interview undertaken by NASA’s knowledge management staff with JSC’s CKO Jim 
Rostohar (‘NASA Johnson’s Jim Rostohar’, 2017) in 2017 shows that he can be taken to be 
supportive of personalization when he states that “A healthy knowledge sharing environment 
really contributes to and enhances our quality management efforts”. Rostohar goes on to 
state:  
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“I come from a communication background, so I feel communication is extremely 
important to knowledge sharing. The extent that we can effectively communicate the 
value of knowledge management is directly proportionate to our success.” 
However, Rostohar also discusses initiatives that are firmly rooted in codification, for example 
JSC support the Engineering Academy by developing case studies and classroom materials 
using information from their databases. Under successful knowledge efforts, he notes 
improvements in search functionality, strengthening of case studies, and improvements in 
their Lessons Learned Program, which all revolve around documentation. Rostohar also 
shares a success story about an engineering team that needed to access research done under 
the Apollo program, without which they would need to develop and certify new contingency 
measures that “would take two to three years and add an additional cost of several million 
dollars.” However, when the engineers tried using JSC’s newly implemented IHS Goldfire 
analytical search tool they were able to find the relevant information that they had not been 
able to find using the standard JSC search tool. This enabled the project to move forward 
without incurring the additional cost and time delays.  
The interview with JSC’s CKO show that JSC understands the value of personalization but also 
has prominent codification initiatives. The anecdote also shows that JSC still relies on 
knowledge developed decades earlier, pointing to significant reliance on knowledge reuse. 
Therefore, JSC can be seen to have a mixed strategy. 
NASA Engineering and Safety Center (NESC) 
An interview with the CKO at NESC, Dan Yuchnovicz (‘NASA Engineering and Safety Center’s 
Dan Yuchnovicz’, 2016), focuses on the identification and capture of key knowledge and 
lessons across projects. Yuchnovicz tells how the NESC “was established in July 2003 in 
response to the Space Shuttle Columbia accident and provides independent assessment of 
technical issues for NASA programs and projects”.  
The NESC typically has between 80 and 100 assessments open at a time. The assessments 
contribute to the capture lessons learned (for submission to the lessons-learned information 
system) and the compilation of technical bulletins (one-page summaries of engineering 
knowledge, best practices and references to further information). Other main outputs include 
NESC Engineering Reports, and NESC Technical Updates. NESC then surveyed trends across 
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1,900 recommendations and over 100 lessons learned from over 600 Assessment Reports to 
determine how these were being used by the agency. 
The NESC Academy offers videos, online training and webinars that get senior technical 
experts to share critical competencies. At the time of the interview, the NESC Academy had 
surpassed 50,000 lifetime views, 20,000 of which took place in the year of the interview.  
Yuchnovicz also referenced the reuse of knowledge at NASA with an anecdote of how the 
NESC brought several Apollo era engineers out of retirement to assist with the Constellation 
Program, and in the process recovered many Apollo engineering reports thought to be gone.  
The interview with Yuchnovicz shows a strong emphasis on codification at NESC, reinforces 
by what is clearly a significant investment in online training facilities. In terms of Hansen et al. 
(1999), this would check all the boxes of people-to-documents, reuse economics, invest 
heavily in I.T. to connect people with reusable codified knowledge and use it to train your 
staff at a distance. Nonetheless, the reference to Apollo era engineers, and reliance on senior 
technical experts to lead assessment teams and develop training shows that NESC depends 
to large extent on individual expertise even though it is on a scale that tends to surpass the 
reliance on any single individual. Considering the evidence, NESC seems to tend towards a 
codification-based strategy. 
NASA’s Scientific and Technical Information Program Office (STI) 
Karen Fallon is the Knowledge Services Lead at STI. In an interview from 2017 (‘STI’s Karen 
Fallon’, 2017) published on the NASA APPEL website, she describes how STIs collection of 
research is:  
“a highly esteemed repository of scientific and technical research information. We 
have a technical team that preserves it, but also ensures that it is maintained at the 
highest degree of preservation in order to make the oldest documents from the early 
1900s as searchable as submissions from yesterday.”  
Further on in the interview, Fallon alludes to the sheer volume of records they curate and 
make available on both public and restricted-access platforms: 
“On our public site (NTRS) we average about 400,000 downloads per month. It’s 
important to caveat this number. These are searchers who have not just googled 
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something. They have come to search NASA STI for defined pieces of information. We 
also average 20,000 to 30,000 requests per month for specific, restricted information 
which is sourced from the registered user site (NTRS-R). The combined repositories 
have over 4.5 million entries from the early 1900s during the Wright Brothers up until 
today.” 
Fallon goes on to note how in terms of I.T. “we try to ensure that we have the latest and 
greatest technology and practices as far as maintaining, preserving and disseminating our 
information.” The interview with Fallon shows that STI is focuses almost exclusively on 
codification, giving little thought to personalization. Given the nature of STI’s mission this is 
not surprising, and there is acknowledgement from Fallon that she sees STI as being involved 
in information management rather than knowledge management when she states: 
“Another challenge we face is how best to exist as an entity, transacting and 
cooperating as an agency information management resource — but also pursuing the 
sweet spot where the information management and knowledge management 
activities intersect within NASA. Our goal is to complement knowledge management 
efforts in addition to other large federal repositories, so we collaborate in a 
complementary way.” 
STI would not exist as a separate program if knowledge reuse did not represent significant 
value for NASA. STIs focus on codification also highlights how agency centers and 
departments have different objectives, and this in turn will affect the balance of codification 
and personalization practiced by that center or department in the context of the greater NASA 
picture. Therefore, like NESC, STI seems to be practicing a strategy based on codification.  
Stennis Space Center (SSC) 
The interview with SSC’s CKO John Stealey (‘SSC’s John Stealey’, 2012) starts with Stealey 
stating that one of their biggest challenges is accessing historical technical data, specifically 
the assumptions and calculations supporting engineering designs. Stealy also discusses how 
SSC has sometimes needed to access past employees to re-learn the knowledge underlying 
current systems.   
Stealey feels that a major misunderstanding around knowledge is that it can be captured, 
maintaining that “True knowledge can’t be stored outside a practitioner’s mind. The only way 
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to completely capture and maintain it is to use it.” Stealey refers approvingly of knowledge 
capture projects, case study development and the incorporating knowledge capture into 
project design and processes at other centers but does not give examples of explicit 
knowledge capture at SSC. 
The interview with Stealy is brief, and while it clearly points to SSC’s fundamental reliance on 
knowledge reuse, it does not seem solely wedded to either codification or personalization 
practices beyond expressing the conviction that knowledge is stored in people and in 
practices. This presents something of a dichotomy, as according to Hansen et al. (1999) reuse 
is a characteristic of codification, while storing knowledge in practitioners (although not to 
say the practices of organizations) is characteristic of personalization. SSC would need to be 
classified as a mixed strategy.  
NASA Engineering Network (NEN) 
The NEN is a collaborative system designed to enable knowledge sharing among 
geographically dispersed practitioners. It is an online system that incorporates communities 
of practice, federated search functionality that 30 different engineering repositories across 
NASA, the lessons-learned system, expert locators, and other resources for NASA engineers.  
Daria Topousis is the Project Manager and Knowledge Services Lead at NASA’s Engineering 
Network Project. In an interview from 2017 (‘NEN’s Daria Topousis’, 2017), she discusses how 
although the network is comprised of both repositories and communities, the communities 
have become fundamental to supporting knowledge sharing through NEN. She explains this 
in the following statement: 
“Communities of practice are really critical to NEN and to knowledge sharing and 
knowledge growth in the engineering discipline. In the early days of NEN the 
communities were just another element that was equal to search and lessons learned. 
As we’ve developed the communities, we have found that they have become the heart 
of NEN and the knowledge sharing that happens between people.” 
She substantiates this by explaining how community members will access information from 
the repositories, but also post questions about it on the network and initiate discussions with 
peers. This carries the same message as the NASA internal discussion document on 
“Knowledge Reapplication at NASA” (Rogers and Ryschkewitsch, 2008) discussed earlier, 
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wherein it was explained that “personal experience”, “personal networks” (both examples of 
personalization) and “common knowledge” (i.e., codified knowledge stored in repositories) 
are complementary rather than being substitutes. Gaps in one area can be bridged by 
leveraging one of the others, for example calling a friend to ask for help accessing technical 
information you don’t have access to. The idea that codification and personalization can exist 
as complementary activities in the same activity is at odds with Hansen et al.’s (1999) theory, 
which requires a dominant-subordinate paradigm along the lines of an 80-20 split.  
With respect to Hansen et al. (1999), Topousis raises in her interview how NEN’s knowledge 
management practices include personalization and codification initiatives, and how 
personalization is an important complement enabling the use of codified knowledge, 
suggesting that codification and personalization are not necessarily contradictory to one 
another.  
Jet Propulsion Lab (JPL) 
David Oberhettinger, the CKO at JPL, has made significant contributions to knowledge 
management strategy at an agency level as well as at JPL, and Oberhettinger’s contributions 
are referenced in other parts of this thesis.  
In an interview in 2013 (‘JPL’s David Oberhettinger’, 2013) Oberhettinger referred to the 
importance of repositories and advanced search technology, as well as to Lunch-and-Learn 
sessions and Pause-and-Learn sessions for supporting JPL’s projects. Repositories and search 
technology are typically tools to support codification, while Lunch-and-Learn Pause-and-
Learn sessions are typical personalization activities designed to bring staff together to share 
knowledge.  
That Oberhettinger gave equal emphasis to both codification and personalization in the brief 
interview, without clear emphasis on one or the other, shows that JPL probably takes a 
balanced view of knowledge management. That is to say, JPL does not emphasize one 
approach and subordinate the other.  
Conclusion from KM at NASA centers, departments and projects 
The interviews above re-emphasized that NASA relies on knowledge reuse to a large extent 
(this was also seen in the previous sections that referred to knowledge economics) and that 
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sometimes the knowledge that NASA relies on is held in the heads of experts, resulting in 
them having to seek out retired experts to recover ‘lost’ knowledge. The CKOs at the NASA 
centers generally recognized this to be a problem that needed to be addressed by improving 
the capturing and sharing of knowledge across the organization.  
Where NASA has captured knowledge it is not just codified in documents, but also stored in 
organizational practices (e.g., processes and procedures) so that the application of this 
knowledge becomes part of the work routine. While the CKOs interviewed above recognize 
the need to improve codification to prevent knowledge loss, and generally have various 
initiatives aimed at capturing this knowledge, most CKOs were explicit in noting that an 
overreliance on codification alone will not work. Exceptions could be found in 
departments/projects specifically geared towards codification, like NEN and STI where the 
focus was on record-keeping. However, it could be argued that this resulted from a mandate 
focused almost exclusively on maintaining a repository. Nonetheless, most CKOs have 
expressed a need to balance codification with personalization. Indeed, many of the interviews 
showed that codification and personalization needed to co-exist to enable one another.  
This meant that knowledge management practices across NASA centers, departments and 
projects could generally be seen to be in-line with the knowledge management strategy 
expressed by Hoffman at the central level. It also means that NASA can be seen to be pursuing 
both codification and personalization strategies, or straddling as it would be termed by 
Hansen et al. (1999).  
 What does NASA’s Knowledge Map look like? 
NASA’s Academy of Program/Project and Engineering Leadership (APPEL) manages the NASA 
knowledge portal that brings together all of NASA’s knowledge resources. A central feature 
of the portal is the “NASA Knowledge Map”. This map does not describe the actual stocks of 
knowledge at NASA, but rather lists all the knowledge services and initiatives across the 
different centers and categorizes them by type (NASA Knowledge Map, undated). As such, 
because it maps knowledge management activities it may be more accurately thought of as a 
“knowledge management map”, but to avoid confusion this thesis will refer to it by NASA’s 
designation of the NASA Knoweldge Map.  
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In this section the focus is evaluating the information available in NASA’s KM Map to answer 
3 questions: 
 How does NASA categorize its knowledge management initiatives? 
NASA CKOs have classified their initiatives in a consistent way across these 6 categories. 
An examination of the categories to see what they contain and how they correspond to 
Hansen et al.’s (1999) two categories of people-to-documents or people-to-people will 
give an insight into how NASA’s knowledge management activities correspond to 
Hansen et al.’s theory.  
 How are initiatives distributed across these categories? 
There are 414 initiatives across the 6 categories. Does the distribution of these 
initiatives across the categories give us more insight into whether NASA is leaning 
towards people-to-documents or people-to-people overall?  
 What is the balance of initiatives (by category) across the centers? 
There are 25 centers represented on the knowledge map. Do all the centers exhibit the 
same mix of categories and initiatives? Are certain types of center similar? What does 
the mix of people-to-documents or people-to-people initiatives reveal about the 
knowledge management strategy? Are there other characteristics that could help to 
explain the variance between centers? 
The answers to the 3 questions above will give an indication whether knowledge 
management efforts are tending towards people-to-documents or people-to-people, or 
perhaps both at the same time. This can then be compared to the insights gained from the 
interviews with NASA CKOs and the information that they have published about knowledge 
management at NASA to see if it provides a consistent picture with respect to their knowledge 
management strategy.  
How does NASA categorize its knowledge management initiatives? 
The six categories used by NASA (Hoffman, 2013) are: 
• KM online tools - Any online knowledge tools, including but not limited to: portals, 
document repositories, collaboration and sharing sites, video libraries. Examples of 
initiatives found under the online tools category shows information systems, 
SharePoint for collaboration, Best Practices repositories, lessons-learned information 
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systems, document management systems, data storage and archiving, digital libraries 
and repositories, E-libraries, websites, wikis, and online portals. It also contained a 
photo repository, a problem reporting and corrective action system, a safety, health 
& environmental portal, a shuttle knowledge console, an online mentor matching 
portal, and a video library. 
• Search/tag/taxonomy tools - Dedicated search engine for knowledge (e.g., Google 
Search Appliance); any initiatives related to meta-tagging or taxonomy. Examples of 
specific initiatives found in this category show mainly search engines, application 
development to support search engines, data mining and analytics tools, taxonomies 
and tagging for information systems and lessons-learned systems, and a cross-
referencing service. 
• Case studies/Publications - Original documents or multimedia case studies that 
capture project stories and associated lessons learned or best practices (e.g., GSFC 
case studies; APPEL case studies and ASK Magazine stories; NASA Safety Center case 
studies, etc.).Collating the initiatives under this showed predominantly case studies as 
well as reports, strategy papers, public papers, historical records, oral history 
transcripts, newsletters, articles and presentations. 
• Lessons learned/Knowledge processes - Any defined process that an organization uses 
to identify or capture knowledge, lessons learned, or best practices, including: Lessons 
Learned Information System vetting process, organization-specific lessons learned 
processes, benchmarking, knowledge sharing recognition programs, etc.). In terms of 
actual initiatives, this category included mainly lessons-learned processes (including 
processes for capturing lessons, “distilling teams”, advisory committees, review 
committees, submission, and storage repositories), benchmarking activities, 
document management procedures (storage and archival), as well as continuous 
improvement processes (e.g., Six Sigma), training program content, and some pause-
and-learn activities (arguably another brand of lessons-learned).   
• Knowledge networks - Any defined knowledge network, such as a community of 
practice, expert locator, or mass collaboration activity. The initiatives in this category 
showed a lot of communities of practice, working groups, expert locators, online chat 
groups, and a wiki. 
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• Face-to-face - Any activities that bring people together in person to share knowledge 
and enhance relationships, trust, and open exchanges. Impact can be multiplied 
through online sharing. The initiatives listed under this category were mostly 
concerned with events, workshops, colloquia, courses, facilitated sessions, knowledge 
forums, lunch-and-learn sessions, knowledge map conversations, master’s forums, 
seminars, panel discussions, presentations, pause-and-learn workshops, storytelling 
events, virtual research labs and mentoring programs. 
These categories offer a useful insight into how knowledge managers at NASA perceive 
knowledge management in terms of people-to-documents and people-to-people. The main 
question is whether these can provide a useful metric for how knowledge management 
efforts at NASA conform to Hansen et al.’s (1999) theory of ‘codification’ versus 
‘personalization’ strategies.  
The ‘people-to-documents’ approach is basically synonymous with codification, while the 
‘people-to-people’ approach is synonymous with personalization. Therefore, going forward 
in this chapter, the terms codification and personalization will be used. Considering the first 
four categories, they all seem to fall under the definition of ‘codification’: 
1. KM online tools – These are repositories built around holding codified knowledge and 
making it available to other users. Note NASA has not included ‘expert locators’ here, but 
instead classified these under ‘knowledge networks’. Therefore, these systems are 
exclusively concerned with storing codified knowledge.  
2. Search/tag/taxonomy tools – Tools to classify codified knowledge and make it easier for 
users to find the knowledge stored in repositories and systems, these are an integral part 
of codification efforts.   
3. Case studies/Publications – These are the most fundamental form of codified knowledge, 
that has been made independent from its originator and converted into a document 
(electronic or physical).  
4. Lessons learned/Knowledge processes – These are processes to facilitate the capture and 
conversion of knowledge, and therefore fall under the codification effort. 
The last two categories correspond to ‘personalization’: 
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5. Knowledge networks – This describes ongoing group interactions (such as working 
groups, communities of practice) and tools used to facilitate these groups (such as expert 
locators and wikis). Therefore, as this category focuses on interaction rather than 
codifying knowledge, it is considered to correspond to personalization under Hansen et 
al.’s (1999) framework.  
6. Face-to-face – This category describes in-person events and once-off events, although it 
does not rule out the use of online resources. Being primarily about communication and 
interaction between persons rather than codification, it is considered to fit Hansen et 
al.’s (1999) concept of personalization.  
None of the categories shares characteristics that can be found under both codification and 
personalization strategies, and so none are considered to present a ‘mixed’ classification.  
That there are four categories of codification versus two categories of personalization is a 
useful distinction, but this alone does not reveal the extent of activity under each category 
and therefore whether activities are weighted more in favor of one type of activity than the 
other. Therefore, the next step is to consider how initiatives are distributed across the 
categories.  
How are initiatives distributed across these categories? 
The distribution of initiatives across the categories may provide some insight into whether 
NASA is leaning towards codification or personalization in terms of its knowledge 
management. Extracting individual initiatives from the NASA Knowledge Map generates a list 
of 414 separate initiatives in 6 categories across 25 centers, represented in figure 1 below: 
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Table 5 Initiatives by category across NASA centers 
Center or organization Face-to-face 
knowledge 
services
Knowledge 
Networks
Case study / 
Publication
Lessons Learned 
/ Knowledge 
Processes
Online Tools Search/Tag/ 
Taxonomy Tools
Academy of Program/Project and Engineering Leadership 9 0 9 0 0 0
Aeronautics Research Mission Directorate 1 3 2 2 1 0
Ames Research Center 2 1 0 4 4 0
Armstrong Flight Research Center 2 0 1 1 2 1
Cost Analysis Division 1 1 1 0 3 2
Glenn Research Center 4 1 1 3 2 0
Goddard Space Flight Center 12 2 6 5 3 4
History Office 1 3 2 4 5 2
Human Exploration and Operations Mission Directorate 5 1 0 5 5 2
Independent Verification and Validation 9 3 1 4 5 4
Jet Propulsion Laboratory 17 3 3 3 7 4
Johnson Space Center 8 1 5 2 3 3
Kennedy Space Center 2 0 0 3 7 2
Langley Research Center 5 2 0 3 8 3
Marshall Space Flight Center 3 3 3 4 8 0
NASA Engineering and Safety Center 9 2 3 3 9 1
NASA Engineering Network 4 1 0 4 2 2
NASA Safety Center 8 4 5 4 6 2
Office of Human Capital Management 1 2 0 2 4 0
Office of Procurement 6 0 0 0 3 0
Office of the Chief Health and Medical Officer 0 0 1 0 0 1
Science Mission Directorate 7 0 0 1 9 2
Scientific and Technical Information 1 2 1 2 3 4
Space Technology Mission Directorate 1 1 6 0 3 2
Stennis Space Center 3 1 1 2 1 0
TOTAL 121 37 51 61 103 41
PERSONALISATION CODIFICATION
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Using NASA’s classification, a more visual representation of the initiatives across the agency 
can be provided in Figure 1 below. From this it can be seen that no single category of initiative 
commands an unduly large or small share of the initiatives.  
Figure 1 NASA knowledge services and initiatives 
 
This is important because it shows that the category definitions have been consistently 
applied across the initiatives and centers/departments. Had each center/department been 
responsible for devising their own categories and classifying their initiatives accordingly, there 
would have been a proliferation of categories and less consistency in how initiatives were 
classified between them. 
From this it can be seen that the largest category of knowledge initiative is ‘face-to-face’ 
knowledge services with 121 initiatives (29% of the initiatives). This is followed closely by 
‘online tools’ with 103 initiatives (25%). Lessons learned / knowledge processes are 61 
initiatives (15%), case studies / publications have 51 initiatives (12%), search/tag/taxonomy 
tools have 41 initiatives (10%), and knowledge networks (the smallest group) account for 37 
(9%) of initiatives listed on the knowledge map.   
Following on the discussion in the preceding section (“How does NASA categorize its 
knowledge management initiatives”), totaling the number of initiatives under each category 
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can give a better idea of the prevalence of initiatives under each category. This has been 
carried out in the table below (Table 6 NASA knowledge initiatives by type).  
Table 6 NASA knowledge initiatives by type 
 
Recall that in the previous section (“How does NASA categorize its knowledge management 
initiatives?”) it was determined that the first four categories (online tools, search tools, case 
studies/publications, and lessons learned/knowledge processes) could be assumed to qualify 
as codification initiatives based on Hansen et al.’s (1999) framework. Similarly, it was 
determined that the last two categories (knowledge networks, face-to-face services) could be 
classified as personalization initiatives. No categories were identified as having a ‘mix’ of 
codification and personalization initiatives.  
If the four codification categories are totaled up (as in Table 6 above), codification accounts 
for 62% of initiatives listed on the NASA Knowledge Map. Conversely, the two categories 
identified as personalization account for 38% of the initiatives listed on the NASA Knowledge 
Map. From this it can be seen that by a simple count, there are more codification initiatives 
than there are personalization initiatives at NASA, and suggests that NASA is favoring a 
codification, or “people-to-documents” approach, but not to the extent where it is the 
dominant strategy by an 80-20 margin. From this perspective, it looks like NASA is exercising 
a balanced strategy with a slight emphasis on codification.  
What is the balance of initiatives (by category) across the centers? 
Thus far the analysis has examined knowledge management initiatives at NASA from a 
consolidated perspective (i.e., for NASA as a whole). While this approach is interesting in 
terms of identifying a potential overall trend, it may not be an accurate indication of what is 
happening at each of the NASA centers on an individual basis. 
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The centers may exhibit different tendencies in terms of codification or personalization. 
Groups of centers may show similar traits. Centers may mix codification and personalization 
to differing degrees, and based on available information there may be other characteristics 
that influence whether a center emphasizes one strategy over another. Therefore, this 
section will look at the balance of codification and personalization initiatives at each of the 
centers to see if it reflects the overall pattern at NASA, and if the centers do behave 
differently, then in what way.  
To undertake this analysis, the number of codification and personalization initiatives at each 
center was totaled, respectively. The number of ‘knowledge networks’ initiatives and ‘face-
to-face services’ initiatives were added together to determine the total number of 
personalization initiatives per center.  The number of ‘online tools’ initiatives, ‘search tools’ 
initiatives, ‘case studies/publications’ initiatives and ‘lessons learned/knowledge processes’ 
initiatives were added together to determine the number of ‘codification initiatives per 
center. The results are shown in Table 7 below, where they are ranked from most 
personalization initiatives to least personalization initiatives. 
A third column shows the total number of initiatives (personalization initiatives and the 
codification initiatives added together).  
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Table 7 Personalization versus codification initiatives at NASA centers 
 
From Table 7 above, it can be seen that the 25 NASA centers show a wide variation in the 
number of initiatives documented on the agency’s KM map, from as few as 2 at the Office of 
the Chief Health and Medical Officer, up to as many as 37 at the Jet Propulsion Lab (JPL).  
The reason for this variance in number of knowledge management initiatives is not clear, and 
a thorough investigation of the possible causes for this could constitute a whole other study. 
The reasons could be historical, or due to the prevailing culture at the center. However, initial 
expectations are this its correlate with the nature of the work undertaken by the center 
and/or the size of the center. For example, it may be expected that centers involved in more 
process-driven activities (like procurement and cost-analysis) would face less need for 
scientific innovation than a field center, and therefore have fewer knowledge management 
initiatives. Similarly, smaller centers can be expected to have fewer knowledge management 
Type of initiative Codification Personalisation Total
Jet Propulsion Laboratory 17 20 37
Goddard Space Flight Center 18 14 32
NASA Safety Center 17 12 29
Independent Verification and Validation 14 12 26
NASA Engineering and Safety Center 16 11 27
Johnson Space Center 13 9 22
Academy of Program/Project and Engineering Leadership 9 9 18
Langley Research Center 14 7 21
Science Mission Directorate 12 7 19
Marshall Space Flight Center 15 6 21
Human Exploration and Operations Mission Directorate 12 6 18
Office of Procurement 3 6 9
NASA Engineering Network 8 5 13
Glenn Research Center 6 5 11
History Office 13 4 17
Aeronautics Research Mission Directorate 5 4 9
Stennis Space Center 4 4 8
Scientific and Technical Information 10 3 13
Ames Research Center 8 3 11
Office of Human Capital Management 6 3 9
Kennedy Space Center 12 2 14
Space Technology Mission Directorate 11 2 13
Cost Analysis Division 6 2 8
Armstrong Flight Research Center 5 2 7
Office of the Chief Health and Medical Officer 2 0 2
TOTAL 256 158 414
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initiatives than larger centers. However, it needs to be investigated to determine if this is 
actually the case. 
Based on the brief description of agency centers given in section 1.4, it is clear that the table 
is not reflecting work in descending order of complexity or expertise. These organizations are 
all engaged in equally challenging aspects of the aerospace industry.   
To progress the analysis, the information from Table 7 has been augmented to produce Table 
8 below. This shows field centers in bold, and to also indicates number of employees (where 
this information is available). Employment figures were obtained from the NASA FY 2017 
Agency Report (2017: 10), with the exception of JPL and the Independent Verification and 
Validation facility.  These were obtained from the Caltech website (‘Caltech at a Glance’, 2018) 
and Wikipedia (‘Independent Verification and Validation Facility’, 2018), respectively. Note 
that these numbers show employees only, and do not take into account contractors that may 
contribute significant additional headcount at the facility. 
Table 8 Personalization and codification against organization type and employee count 
 
Type of initiative Employees Codification Personalisation Total
Jet Propulsion Laboratory 5500 17 20 37
Goddard Space Flight Center 3230 18 14 32
NASA Safety Center 17 12 29
Independent Verification and Validation 270 14 12 26
NASA Engineering and Safety Center 16 11 27
Johnson Space Center 3112 13 9 22
Academy of Program/Project and Engineering Leadership 9 9 18
Langley Research Center 1821 14 7 21
Science Mission Directorate 12 7 19
Marshall Space Flight Center 2322 15 6 21
Human Exploration and Operations Mission Directorate 12 6 18
Office of Procurement 3 6 9
NASA Engineering Network 8 5 13
Glenn Research Center 1590 6 5 11
History Office 13 4 17
Aeronautics Research Mission Directorate 5 4 9
Stennis Space Center 300 4 4 8
Scientific and Technical Information 10 3 13
Ames Research Center 1180 8 3 11
Office of Human Capital Management 6 3 9
Kennedy Space Center 1981 12 2 14
Space Technology Mission Directorate 11 2 13
Cost Analysis Division 6 2 8
Armstrong Flight Research Center 556 5 2 7
Office of the Chief Health and Medical Officer 2 0 2
TOTAL 256 158 414
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Looking at the field centers indicated in bold in the table above, it can be seen that the 
number of initiatives corresponding to field centers and other departments/projects ranges 
widely.  
The case can be made by looking at a few examples. In terms of field centers, the Goddard 
Space Flight center has 32 initiatives, while at the other end of the scale Armstrong Flight 
Research Center has only 7 initiatives listed.  Similarly, for other departments, the 
Independent Verification and Validation facility has 26 initiatives listed, while the Office of 
the Chief Health and Medical Officer has only 2 listed. Finally, comparing departments and 
projects to field centers, it can be seen that the Office of Procurement has more knowledge 
management initiatives than the Stennis Space Center (8) or the Armstrong Flight Research 
Center (7). Therefore, it does not seem that the nature of the work undertaken by the center 
is a reliable indicator of whether it will have many or few initiatives.  
Employee numbers, on the other hand, show a more positive correlation. Higher employee 
numbers tend to correlate with more knowledge management initiatives in general. The 
reasons for this remain ambiguous: it could be that more staff mean that there is more 
knowledge work being undertaken, or it could mean that in bigger populations knowledge is 
not shared as easily and so extra effort is needed to disseminate it. Again, this could be the 
topic of further study in itself. The information from Table 8 (Personalization and codification 
against organization type and employee count) is illustrated as a graph in Figure 2 below, with 
trendlines added.  
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Figure 2 Total number of initiatives and employee numbers 
 
In Figure 2, the number of centers has been organized from highest number of initiatives to 
lowest number of initiatives (left to right) using a line chart. Employee numbers were not 
available for all the centers and facilities, so these have been added using a scatterplot 
corresponding to the secondary axis.  
Trendlines where added for both datasets. The trendlines show that a high number of 
employees corresponds to a high number of initiatives. This may be explained on that basis 
that a large organization is less able to rely on informal means of knowledge codification and 
transfer, as may be found in a small organization. Therefore, it makes sense that a large 
organization is more likely to implement formal initiatives to ensure that knowledge is 
captured and transmitted effectively.  
Ratio of codification to personalization 
The analysis so far has shown the variance in knowledge management initiatives across NASA 
centers and offered some explanations for this variance. However, it has not yet addressed 
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the mix of codification to personalization initiatives that could serve as an indicator whether 
NASA is pursuing an overall codification or personalization strategy, or attempting to straddle 
both.  
To investigate this an additional indicator showing the ratio of codification to personalization 
initiatives has been added in Table 9 below. A number greater than 1 indicates that the center 
has more codification initiatives than personalization initiatives. A number less than 1 
indicates that the center has more personalization initiatives than codification initiatives. 
For example, Jet Propulsion Lab has 17 codification initiatives divided by 20 personalization 
initiatives, which gives a ratio of 0.9 indicating that there are more personalization initiatives 
than codification initiatives. For Goddard Space Flight Center, 18 codification initiatives 
divided by 14 personalization initiatives gives a ratio of 1.3, indicating that there are fewer 
personalization initiatives than codification initiatives.  
Table 9 The ratio of codification to personalization initiatives 
 
Across the 25 centers/departments, 21 have more codification initiatives than personalization 
initiatives, 2 have an equal balance, and only 2 have more personalization initiatives than 
Type of initiative Codification Personalisation Total Ratio (C:P)
Jet Propulsion Laboratory 17 20 37 0.9
Goddard Space Flight Center 18 14 32 1.3
NASA Safety Center 17 12 29 1.4
Independent Verification and Validation 14 12 26 1.2
NASA Engineering and Safety Center 16 11 27 1.5
Johnson Space Center 13 9 22 1.4
Academy of Program/Project and Engineering Leadership 9 9 18 1.0
Langley Research Center 14 7 21 2.0
Science Mission Directorate 12 7 19 1.7
Marshall Space Flight Center 15 6 21 2.5
Human Exploration and Operations Mission Directorate 12 6 18 2.0
Office of Procurement 3 6 9 0.5
NASA Engineering Network 8 5 13 1.6
Glenn Research Center 6 5 11 1.2
History Office 13 4 17 3.3
Aeronautics Research Mission Directorate 5 4 9 1.3
Stennis Space Center 4 4 8 1.0
Scientific and Technical Information 10 3 13 3.3
Ames Research Center 8 3 11 2.7
Office of Human Capital Management 6 3 9 2.0
Kennedy Space Center 12 2 14 6.0
Space Technology Mission Directorate 11 2 13 5.5
Cost Analysis Division 6 2 8 3.0
Armstrong Flight Research Center 5 2 7 2.5
Office of the Chief Health and Medical Officer 2 0 2 undef.
TOTAL 256 158 414
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codification initiatives. Unfortunately, no information is available that gives an indication of 
the relative sizes of these initiatives. This would add a useful dimension of ‘weighting’ that 
could balance out the differences in frequency of initiatives.  
The information from the table above is summarised in the histogram below (Figure 3). Note 
that the Office of the Chief Health and Medical Officer has an ‘undefined’ ratio, as 2 
codification initiatives divided by 0 personalization initiatives does not yield a meaningful 
result. 
It is interesting to note that JPL has significantly more personalization initiatives than any of 
the other 24 centers/departments. With 20 personalization initiatives, JPL has 43% more 
personalization initiatives than the center with the next highest count, which is Goddard 
Space Flight Center at 14 personalization initiatives. JPL also ranks in the top-three for 
codification initiatives. It may be worth noting that JPL is the only ‘privately run’ NASA field 
center (‘Caltech Receives Five-Year JPL Contract from NASA’, 2012). The California Institute of 
Technology, often referred to as Caltech, has been involved in JPL since its inception and note 
that JPL has never been operated by any other institution. That Caltech is an academic 
institution rather than a government agency may result in JPL being managed differently from 
other NASA centers, and may be a factor in the greater emphasis on personalization 
initiatives.  
In Figure 3 below the codification: personalization ratios shown in Table 9 The ratio of 
codification to personalization initiatives are presented as a histogram showing the number 
of departments that have a positive codification: personalization ratio (more codification 
initiatives than personalization initiatives). 
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Figure 3 Number of centers/departments by codification: personalization ratio 
 
In Figure 3 it can be seen that 22 of the 25 centers either have as many or more codification 
initiatives as personalization initiatives (23 if the Office of the Chief Health and Medical Officer 
is included in this count for having 2 codification initiatives and no personalization initiatives). 
11 (i.e., 6 + 3 + 2) centers/departments have at least twice as many codification initiatives as 
personalization initiatives. Two centers have more than 5 times more codification initiatives 
than personalization initiatives.  
This indicates a high prevalence of codification initiatives within centers/departments and 
across NASA as a whole and may suggest that codification is the dominant strategy over 
personalization. However, if Figure 2 (Total number of initiatives and employee numbers) is 
revised to show codification and personalization initiatives (rather than just total number of 
initiatives) it may moderate this conclusion.  
This has been done in Figure 4 below, which centers ranked by number personalization 
initiatives (highest to lowest) and also shows the number of codification initiatives. The 
addition of trendlines for each of these graphs shows that organizations that have a high 
number of codification initiatives also have a high number of personalization initiatives, and 
vice versa. That is to say, organizations tend to have many of both or few of both compared 
to other organizations.  
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Figure 4 Trends in personalization and codification initiatives, ranked by personalization 
 
The situation can be seen to be the same when centers are ranked by frequency of 
codification initiative first, as shown in Figure 5 below: 
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Figure 5 Trends in personalization and codification initiatives, ranked by codification 
 
This could also be seen as supporting the conclusion that where a center has a high number 
of knowledge management initiatives it generally manifests as a mix of both types of 
initiatives, but with the emphasis tending to be on codification initiatives across almost all the 
NASA centers.  
Therefore, although it can be concluded that NASA’s knowledge management approach 
emphasizes codification, or people-to-document systems, the number of personalization 
initiatives in the mix is still quite high. This supports the conclusion that NASA’s Knowledge 
Map shows a balanced approach to codification and personalization.   
The main question then is whether the personalization initiatives here are playing a 
supporting role to the codification initiatives, or whether NASA is engaged in an attempt to 
straddle both knowledge management approaches.  
Conclusion on NASA’s knowledge map 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
82 
 
NASA has categories that clearly correspond to person-to-documents and person-to-person 
knowledge management initiatives. NASA CKOs have classified their knowledge management 
initiatives into these categories, and the categories show that that there are more person-to-
documents initiatives than person-to-person initiatives. However, this does not provide 
information as to the extent of activities in each category and it is necessary to look at the 
number of individual initiatives under each category.  
The individual initiatives from each of these categories also show a leaning towards 
codification initiatives over personalization initiatives. Within the individual centers the story 
is slightly more nuanced. The number of initiatives by center ranges widely. It does not seem 
to depend on the nature of the work undertaken at the center, but centers with more 
employees tend to have more of both types of initiatives. Once again, the number of 
codification initiatives outweighs the number of personalization initiatives at almost all 
centers, which is not in line with Hansen et al.’s (1999) expectations regarding how 
personalization is needed for innovation.  
However, there are also prominent elements of person-to-person (personalization) 
initiatives. Because personalization strategies, although being fewer in number, still present 
a significant proportion of activities on the map (38% in Table 6), the evidence presented does 
not support the notion that the personalization initiatives are in a supporting role to the 
codification initiatives. As such, the analysis of the knowledge map supports the conclusion 
that NASA is practicing a balanced knowledge management strategy, or straddling. 
 Overall conclusion on NASA knowledge management strategy 
NASA’s knowledge management journey shows how since the mid-1980’s NASA went from 
emphasizing a personalization approach to emphasizing codification in the 1990’s until the 
advent of its federated model where the emphasis is on a balance between people and 
technology.  NASA’s central strategy clearly exhibits elements aimed at identifying and 
capturing critical knowledge as well as focusing on ensuring sharing of knowledge and access 
to knowledge. Therefore, knowledge management strategy at the agency level can clearly be 
seen to be straddling both codification and personalization. 
To determine if the individual centers, departments and projects are following this lead, 
transcripts of interviews with CKOs across the NASA centers and departments were reviewed, 
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as well as an analysis of the NASA knowledge map. Both of these showed evidence that a 
balanced strategy is being pursued, although in the case of the Knowledge Map the emphasis 
seemed to be more on the codification side. However, the mix was not so uneven so as to 
approximate an 80-20 mix. While there was plenty of evidence of codification, it was not 
found that it was being promoted as the dominant strategy, and there was no evidence to 
suggest that personalization was being allocated a supporting role. As such, NASA can be said 
to have a balanced knowledge management strategy, or what Hansen et al. (1999) would 
refer to as ‘straddling’.   
3.3  Human resources strategy  
This section will focus on determining whether there are any metrics available from NASA’s 
human resources department that suggest NASA is taking a human resources approach that 
is compatible with codification or personalization under Hansen et al.’s (1999) framework.  
Hansen et al. (1999) note that depending on their choice of competitive strategy, a company 
will pursue a compatible human resources strategy. An organization pursuing a codification 
strategy will recruit less experienced staff to implement solutions based on knowledge reuse, 
are more likely to train their staff in a standardized way (for example in groups or through 
online computer-based learning) and incentivize staff to contribute to databases and 
repositories (Hansen et al., 1999: 109).  
Organizations that pursue a personalization strategy are more likely to recruit highly-
qualified, experienced staff in order to apply their analytical and creative skills to unique 
problems. Staff are developed through mentoring and the accumulation of experience (not 
standardized training), and staff are incentivized to share knowledge directly with other staff 
(Hansen et al., 1999: 109).  
Four indicators will be considered in order to investigate whether NASA conforms to one or 
the other approach. Investigating these to see if the characteristics described by Hansen et 
al. (1999) are present, it will be possible to determine if codification or personalization is being 
followed.  
1. Staff occupations – What categories of work do the staff at NASA do, what sort of 
qualifications are staff members in each category expected to hold, and what is the 
distribution of staff across these categories. This will give an indication whether NASA can 
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rely on developing fresh graduates, or whether NASA is likely to employ staff that are 
already experienced and qualified.  
2. Employee turnover - If NASA is relying on using less experienced graduates to implement 
solutions then it is likely it would show an elevated employee turnover rate amongst its 
science and engineering staff. Conversely, maintaining a complement of qualified and 
experienced staff would show a reduced employee turnover among its scientists and 
engineers. 
3. Length of service / staff age - Similarly, length of service and staff age parameters should 
show a higher proportion of young staff with lower length of service for a codification 
strategy, and a higher proportion of older staff with longer service lengths for a 
personalization strategy.  
4. Staff training - Staff training under a codification scenario should show more instances of 
online training platforms and standardized group training. Under a personalization 
scenario there is likely to be more evidence of mentor programs.  
Unfortunately, it has been difficult to find information relating to incentivizing staff to 
document or share knowledge. Nonetheless, the four indicators above should provide 
sufficient evidence to draw a conclusion about NASA’s human resources approach and how 
it reconciles with its knowledge management approach. 
 Staff occupations at NASA 
Information on the NASA workforce by is available through the NASA Workforce Information 
Cubes database (Workforce Information Cubes for NASA, undated). Data extracted from this 
is show in Table 10 below.  
Table 10 NASA staff by occupation at September 2018 
 
NASA occupations in each category can be described as follows (NASA Occupations, undated): 
NASA staff by occupation at Sept 2018 Employees % of total
Scientific and engineering 11,164         65%
Professional administration 5,071           29%
Clerical 256              1%
Technician 765              4%
Wage -               0%
Total 17,256         100%
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Engineering and Scientific - Occupations in this category require knowledge in a specialized 
field such as science, math, engineering. These positions generally require a bachelor's degree 
or higher degree with major study in a specialized field. This group covers positions such as 
aerospace engineering, biology, computer engineering, computer science, general 
engineering, and meteorology.  
Professional and administration - Occupations in this category require knowledge of 
principles, concepts, and practices associated with organizations, administration or 
management. Some positions relating to accounting and law may require specialized 
education, most of these positions do not (except for contracting positions) as they generally 
involve the type of skills (analytical, research, writing, judgment) typically gained through a 
college level education, or through progressively responsible experience. This group covers 
positions such as administrative specialist, budget analyst, contract specialist, information 
technology specialist, and public affairs specialist.  
Clerical and administrative Support - Occupations in this category provide general office or 
program support duties such as preparing, receiving, reviewing, and verifying documents; 
processing transactions; maintaining office records; or locating and compiling data or 
information from files. This group covers positions such as accounting technician, clerk-typist, 
management assistant, office automation clerk, procurement clerk, and secretary. 
Technical support - Occupations in this category support professional or administrative work. 
Duties require practical knowledge of techniques and equipment, gained through experience 
and/or specific training less than that represented by college graduation. This group covers 
positions such as electronics technician, engineering technician, meteorological technician.  
From Table 10 above it can be seen that scientific and engineering is the largest category of 
staff at NASA, and from the specialized nature of the qualifications required for this category 
it would seem that NASA needs to recruit staff with a relatively high level of qualification for 
this role. However, as will be seen later in this chapter, NASA has good facilities for developing 
staff technical capabilities in-house, and so it is difficult to conclude with confidence whether 
NASA strategy is to recruit highly-qualified and experienced staff, or recruit graduates and 
develop them further in-house. As a result, the determination of NASA’s human resources 
approach (codification or personalization) will need to rely on further analysis below. 
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 Employee turnover at NASA 
Hansen et al. (1999) explain how an organization using the codification strategy will recruit 
younger, less experienced staff to act as implementers of the organization’s knowledge 
management assets, which are codified into repositories. This helps to keep costs low to 
support rapid growth and large revenues, but graduates working for such an organization will 
have limited opportunities to grow their experience and advance their career or earnings.   
Consequently, it is expected that after gaining some early work experience at such an 
organization, the young employee will move on to a company offering greater development 
and career opportunities. This will also enable the organization to replace their staff with a 
fresh crop of low-cost, high-energy graduate students. The net result is that organizations 
pursuing a codification strategy can be expected to exhibit higher staff turnovers.  
Hansen et al. (1999) contrasts this with organizations that follow a personalization strategy 
that relies on recruiting highly qualified staff with accumulated skills and experience, and on 
developing them further. These staff are likely to be trained through one-on-one mentoring.  
This approach is likely to be characterized by lower staff turnover as existing staff accumulate 
knowledge and experience that is seen as an asset to the company. They are given the 
freedom to apply their expertise and paid at a high enough level to keep them from leaving 
the organization.  
Hansen et al. (1999) gave Ernst and Young as an example of a management consultancy that 
embraces the codification strategy. Therefore, it is expected that Ernst and Young should 
show a high level of staff turnover relative to other companies in the management 
consultancy space. Staff turnover statistics are published in the 2016 Annual Report for Ernst 
and Young Switzerland (one of the only Annual Reports available online), and are shown in 
Table 11 below.  
Table 11 Employee turnover rate for Ernst & Young (Switzerland) 
 
Financial year Turnover Total employees Turnover %
2014 441 2240 19.69%
2015 508 2425 20.95%
2016 527 2627 20.06%
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Table 11 shows that over 2014, 2015 and 2016 Ernst and Young Switzerland had an annual 
staff turnover ranging from 19.69 – 20.95%. This seems high, but in order to calibrate 
expectations, it needs to be determined whether these rates are higher or lower than other 
organizations.  
Hansen et al. (1999) cite Andersen Consulting as another example of a codification-based 
company, and examples of personalization-based companies as McKinsey and Company and 
Bain and Company. The difficulty with using these as comparators is that Anderson Consulting 
no longer exists, and McKinsey and Bain are both private firms and therefore do not provide 
publicly-available Annual Reports.  
An outdated article from Fortune Magazine of April 1987 (‘A consulting firm too hot to 
handle?’, 1987) refers to Bain and Company having an 8% staff turnover rate, noting that this 
is substantially below the industry average of 20% and seems consistent with Hansen et al.’s 
(1999) theory. Furthermore, these statistics may be relevant given that Hansen et al. (1999) 
wrote their paper in 1999 – not as long after 1987 as today’s date - and it seems that Ernst 
and Young still subscribe to the high industry average cited in this article.   
It may be that 8% is considered to be a relatively low staff turnover rate and 20% a relatively 
high staff turnover rate in the management consulting sector. However, this still needs to be 
put in perspective if comparisons are to be made with NASA, which is in a different sector 
altogether.  
To calibrate expectations in this regard, it is useful to consider turnover rates across other 
sectors in the American economy. The Compensation Force website provides employee 
turnover rates by industry for the year 2015 (‘2015 Turnover Rates by Industry’, undated). 
These are from data collected by Compdata Surveys and Consulting (based in Kansas, United 
States). These are presented in Table 12 below. 
The table has two columns: ‘voluntary’ and ‘total’. Voluntary turnover counts instances where 
staff have left a company to pursue other opportunities, whereas ‘total’ includes dismissals, 
redundancies and the like. In this analysis we are interested in voluntary staff turnover. 
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Table 12 Employee turnover across major sectors in the United States in 2015 
 
From these figures it can be seen that the overall range of voluntary staff turnover is between 
a low of 6.1% in utilities and 17.8% in hospitality. Banking and finance (which seem most 
analogous to management consultancy) seem to be located at the higher end of the scale at 
14.2%.   
The figures cited in Fortune Magazine and Ernst and Young’s annual report may be citing 
overall turnover. Nonetheless, from the table above it can be seen that 8% can be considered 
at the low end of the scale, and 20% would rank high as an ‘industry average’ even in total 
turnover terms.   
Therefore, from this it can be seen that:  
(i) a staff turnover of 8% can be considered low by the standards of any sector and 
20% can be considered high, and  
(ii) associating a low staff turnover with organizations practicing personalization and 
a high staff turnover with organizations practicing codification appears to be 
consistent with Hansen et al.’s (1999) theory.  
It follows from this that if staff turnover at NASA is analyzed and found to be low (i.e., below 
8%) this could be taken as an indication that NASA has human resources practices consistent 
with a personalization strategy. Conversely, if staff turnover is found to be high, it is an 
indication that NASA may have human resources practices consistent with a codification 
strategy. 
Turnover in 2015 Voluntary Total
All industries 11.6% 16.7%
Banking and Finance 14.2% 19.1%
Healthcare 14.2% 18.9%
Hospitality 17.8% 25.9%
Insurance 8.8% 12.2%
Manufacturing and distribution 9.1% 14.8%
Not-for-profit 11.6% 15.7%
Services 9.0% 14.9%
Utilities 6.1% 9.0%
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While “turnover” is the broad indicator here, the direct factors that contribute to it are things 
such as job satisfaction, remuneration (and benefits) structure, relative scarcity of skills, 
advancement and achievement in areas such as academia, and managerial practices (such as 
pressure to advance or leave the company). Information on remuneration at NASA was not 
available for study, and it is not easy to conjecture: levels could be low due to being a federal-
funded agency, or high due to the specialized nature of the work and the high-profile of many 
of the projects. However, it is likely that the knowledge workers at NASA have a high degree 
of intrinsic motivation as they get to work on ‘interesting projects’ that also open avebues for 
significant academic recognition.  
Using data from the NASA Workforce Information Cubes website (Workforce Information 
Cubes for NASA, undated), staff turnover for science and engineering staff was calculated and 
the results presented in Table 13 below. 
Table 13 Annual turnover in science & engineering staff at NASA 
 
Staff turnover is calculated as total staff losses in a period divided by average staff number 
for that period, multiplied by 100 to arrive at a percentage value (‘How to calculate staff 
turnover?’, undated). From the table above it can be seen that among NASA’s science and 
engineering staff, staff turnover for the past 5 years has ranged between 4-5%.  
This is lower than the turnover average for any sector (voluntary or otherwise), and this 
suggests that NASA retains and develops its staff rather than maintaining high-levels of recent 
graduates and junior staffers. According to Hansen et al. (1999) the low staff turnover would 
suggest human resources practices that are consistent with a personalization approach.  
 
 
Financial year Staff losses Average 
employment
Turnover
2012 512 11,535 4%
2013 490 11,413 4%
2014 433 11,339 4%
2015 578 11,167 5%
2016 496 11,053 4%
2017 505 11,105 5%
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 Length of service of staff at NASA 
Data was also drawn from the NASA Workforce Information Cubes website7 to show the 
number of years of service for science and engineering staff at NASA. This is shown in Table 
14 below:  
Table 14 Years of NASA service for science & engineering staff at FY2017 
 
This data shows that only 12% of science and engineering staff have been employed at NASA 
for under 5 years, 70% of staff have been employed at NASA for over 10 years, and 44% of 
staff have been employed at NASA for 20 years or more. 
The years of service in the tables are an indicator that science and engineering staff are able 
to develop within the organization. This is consistent with an organization pursuing a 
personalization strategy that develops its staff as knowledge assets. A company pursuing a 
codification strategy is more likely to see staff having to circulate between organizations 
within the sector to gain experience and advance their careers. According to Hansen et al.’s 
(1999) theory these numbers are more likely to be consistent with a personalization strategy.  
 Staff training at NASA 
Under a personalization strategy there is expected to be a greater reliance of mentoring and 
interpersonal transfer of knowledge, while under a codification strategy there is expected to 
be a greater emphasis and standardized and group training, typically provided by online 
training systems. As an example of standardization, Hansen et al. (1999) cite the example of 
                                                        
7 Available from: https://wicn.nssc.nasa.gov; Date accessed: 07 September 2018.  
Years of NASA Service No. of S&E staff % of total
Under 5 years 1,375                   12%
5 to 9 1,929                   17%
10 to 14 1,504                   14%
15 to 19 1,335                   12%
20 to 24 489                       4%
25 to 29 2,605                   24%
30 to 34 1,252                   11%
35 to 39 410                       4%
40 or more 144                       1%
Total 11,043                 100%
56%
44%
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Ernst and Young’s Center for Professional Education, where recruits are sent to undertake 
standardized training (1999: 10).  
NASA appears to have a strong mentoring framework in place, as well as strong standardized 
training systems. These are discussed in more detail below. 
Evidence of mentoring 
NASA shows a strong emphasis on mentoring as a method of knowledge transfer. Mentoring 
at NASA is organized by the Office of Human Capital Management (OHCM), which also has a 
number of career development and leadership programs under the same banner (NASA 
Mentoring Program Framework, 2007: 2). The NASA Mentoring Program Framework lays out 
a list of mentoring programs across the 10 NASA field centers, as well as at NASA 
headquarters, the NASA Shared Services Center, and individual agency programs (NASA 
Mentoring Program Framework, 2007: 6). It discusses the provision of formal as well as 
informal mentoring, with formal mentoring taking a structured approach that incorporates 
metrics to ensure improved performance and the maintenance of program integrity (NASA 
Mentoring Program Framework, 2007: 4).  It identified mentoring as filling the following 
purposes (NASA Mentoring Program Framework, 2007: 1): 
• An open-environment for information sharing 
• To provide opportunities for open interaction between employees from different levels 
and disciplines 
• Relationship building to facilitate the sharing of organizational knowledge 
• A vehicle for transferring formal to information organizational knowledge 
• Enhanced communication and collaboration across all levels 
• Improved individual motivation, performance and innovation, and  
• Transfer of technical knowledge, when applicable.  
The age of the Mentoring Program Framework (2007) and the fact that an updated 
framework could not be located on the NASA portal raised the possibility that this program 
was no longer active. However, links were found the Modern Mentoring Program at NASA 
Headquarters (NASA Headquarters Modern Mentoring Program, undated), and other more 
recent references to mentoring activities at NASA could be found. These included: 
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A current article by on the NASA APPEL portal (posted in 2012) on “getting the most from 
your mentor”( McDermott, 2012), A 2016 video in the APPEL portal by Dan Rasky (Senior 
Scientist at NASA) on the Mentor & Apprentice Work Model (‘Dan Rasky: Mentor & 
Apprentice Work Model’, 2016), and A 2017 article by Doctor Lester Wright about the 
Mentoring Matters program at Goddard Space Flight Center (Wright, 2017). Wright serves as 
program manager for the mentoring program for the Talent Cultivation Office at NASA 
Goddard Space Flight Center. 
Evidence of online training systems 
In an article posted on the APPEL web portal by NASA CKO Dr Ed Hoffman entitled 
“Technology-enabled learning” (Hoffman, 2009), he highlights that technology-enabled 
learning is not a universal panacea, stating that:  
“I possess a healthy skepticism when it comes to using technology to achieve better 
learning outcomes. This is not an unfounded bias. I have seen millions of dollars spent 
on technology that promises gains in workforce competence and capability but fails to 
deliver.” (Hoffman, 2009: 1) 
However, Hoffman (2009) follows this by explaining how the appropriate use of technology 
coupled with sound learning-design principles can deliver benefits, and points to how online 
training enables content to be updated to keep pace with the accelerating rate of knowledge 
expiration.  
Hoffman (2009) goes on to discuss how NASA’s Academy for Program/Project and 
Engineering Leadership (APPEL) uses technologies for learning, referring to examples of 
online publications, decision-making tools, blogs, wikis, social and professional networking 
sites to facilitate communities of practice, virtual environments, and online video sharing. 
NASA’s Academy of Program/Project & Engineering Leadership, or APPEL, is a knowledge-
dedicated resource for NASA that is responsible for developing and administering a 
curriculum and tools that advance the skills and careers of the NASA workforce, as well as 
support knowledge management and sharing activities (‘About APPEL Knowledge Services’, 
undated).  
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The most recently available Annual Report at time of writing is APPEL’s Annual Report for the 
2016 financial year (APPEL Annual Report, 2016). In the report, APPEL director Roger Forsgren 
states that APPEL trained 3,300 participants in over 146 courses in the financial year (APPEL 
Annual Report, 2016: 4).  
These are not generic professional development courses from third-party service providers, 
such as health and safety awareness or Excel competency courses. Of the 146 courses, over 
60 of them are specifically designed and developed by APPEL to meet the needs of NASA’s 
technical workforce (APPEL Annual Report, 2016: 9). The APPEL course catalogue shows that 
22 courses are available as on-demand online courses (APPEL Course Catalog: On-demand 
Learning, undated).  
In 2017, NASA announced that APPEL had been recognized as the top project management 
academy in the world for three years running by Human Systems International (HIS), a 
subsidiary of the Project Management Institute (‘From the APPEL Director’, 2017).  
The HSI audit evaluates 14 benchmarks, including curriculum content, internal business 
administration, knowledge management, and internal and external collaborations, and APPEL 
earned the highest scores ever recorded since HSI began assessing project management 
training over 20 years ago. The audit includes more than sixty project management academies 
from companies and organizations such as Rolls Royce, BAE Systems, Airbus, Shell Oil, 
Siemens, and Mercedes-Benz (‘APPEL Named Best Academy in the World by Human Systems 
International’, 2015). 
This shows that the HSI audit is a robust measure of project management training capability, 
and that NASA is a leader in providing standardized training that consistently meets high 
standards. This sounds comparable to Hansen et al.’s (1999) example of the Ernst & Young’s 
Center for Professional Education, that was cited as being typical of the human resources 
approach to human resources management under a codification strategy (Hansen et al., 
1999: 10). 
 Conclusion on NASA’s human resources strategy 
In attempting to determine whether NASA’s approach to human resources management 
conforms to Hansen et al.’s (1999) theory regarding codification versus personalization this 
analysis has looked at four factors, specifically: 
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Staff occupation as an indicator of whether NASA is recruiting graduates and developing them 
in-house (codification), or whether NASA prefers to recruit highly qualified and experienced 
staff (personalization). The analysis showed that NASA has a high proportion of scientists and 
engineers with diverse and specialized technical skills. This suggests that NASA relies on 
recruiting staff that are already highly qualified, but was not conclusive.  
Employee turnover for NASA was significantly below the average for any other sector. 
According to Hansen et al.’s (1999) framework this is consistent with human resource 
practices under a personalization strategy, whereby staff are retained and developed into 
high-value knowledge assets rather than treated as implementing agents of externalized 
knowledge assets.  
Length of service / staff age showed that NASA is characterized by staff with long service 
records, with 70% of staff having stayed at NASA for over 10 years. This is also consistent with 
human resource practices under a personalization strategy.  
Staff training at NASA showed a strong emphasis on mentoring, which according to Hansen 
et al. (1999) is consistent with human resources practices under personalization. However, 
NASA also has world-class facilities offering standardized training and online learning 
facilities, which according to Hansen et al. is consistent with codification.  
The net result is that according to the theory put forward by Hansen et al. (1999), NASA 
exhibits human resources management practices that are associated with personalization, 
but has also invested significant resources in setting up standardized training and online-
learning facilities. According the Hansen et al.’s theory, the latter are consistent with human 
resources management practices that are associated with codification. Therefore, the 
analysis is forced to conclude that NASA is straddling both codification and personalization 
practices when it comes to human resources practices. 
3.4 I.T. strategy 
Hansen et al. (1999) hold that organizations that emphasize codification will tend to invest 
heavily in I.T. primarily as a means of connecting people with re-usable, codified knowledge, 
while organizations that emphasize the personalization of knowledge will tend to invest 
moderately in I.T. and use it as a means of facilitating dialogue and the exchange of tacit 
knowledge (Hansen et al., 1999: 109). 
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In order to determine whether NASA’s I.T. practices are tending towards codification or 
personalization, the analysis in this section will need to show whether (i) the extent of NASA’s 
investment in I.T. is moderate and/or heavy, and/or (ii) whether the purpose of NASA’s I.T. is 
to connect people with re-usable codified knowledge or facilitate conversations between 
people.  
Unfortunately, in the case of point (i) the extent of NASA’s investment in I.T., ‘moderate’ and 
‘heavy’ are subjective terms and so it is unclear how Hansen intend this to be evaluated. The 
most reasonable interpretation seems to be that the organization incurs lower/higher I.T. 
costs relative to similar organizations in the same sector. However, as there are no 
organizations that would provide a comparable benchmark to NASA given its size and the 
nature of its work. Therefore, this analysis will rely on point (ii), that is to identify whether the 
purpose of NASA’s I.T. is to facilitate the reuse of codified knowledge or facilitate 
conversations between people. Given that much of the information necessary to support this 
analysis has been developed in previous sections, this will be a relatively short section by 
comparison. 
Note that this analysis is concerned with how I.T. is employed store and move knowledge 
around the organization, and is distinct from the I.T. employed in specific project objectives. 
That is to say, this analysis is confined to evaluating the manner in which I.T. is used to support 
the organization and the workforce, and not the I.T. built into a Mars rover. 
 Connecting staff with re-usable codified knowledge 
In section 3.2.4 (What does NASA’s Knowledge Map look like?) there was a relatively detailed 
discussion of NASA’s Knowledge Map (NASA Knowledge Map, undated), and it can be seen 
that there are two categories of initiatives on the knowledge map that are concerned with 
I.T. systems, namely (i) knowledge management online tools, and (ii) search/tag/taxonomy 
tools. The two categories with their descriptions (Hoffman, 2013) and contents are again 
given here: 
• KM online tools - Any online knowledge tools, including but not limited to: portals, 
document repositories, collaboration and sharing sites, video libraries.  
Examples of initiatives found under the online tools category shows information 
systems, SharePoint for collaboration, Best Practices repositories, lessons-learned 
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information systems, document management systems, data storage and archiving, 
digital libraries and repositories, E-libraries, websites, wikis, and online portals. It also 
contains isolated cases across the centers of: a photo repository, a problem reporting 
and corrective action system, a safety, health & environmental portal, a shuttle 
knowledge console, an online mentor matching portal, and a video library. 
• Search/tag/taxonomy tools - Dedicated search engine for knowledge (e.g., Google 
Search Appliance); any initiatives related to meta-tagging or taxonomy. Examples of 
specific initiatives found in this category show mainly search engines, application 
development to support search engines, data mining and analytics tools, taxonomies 
and tagging for information systems and lessons-learned systems, and a cross-
referencing service. 
From the category descriptions and nature of the initiatives contained therein, it is clear that 
NASA relies heavily on I.T. systems to store codified knowledge and make it searchable and 
available for staff to reuse. These systems are also likely to contain a lot of knowledge 
embedded in their design, put there in-line with best practices and learnings developed 
during earlier missions. These two categories accounted for 35% of the initiatives listed on 
the NASA Knowledge Map (refer to Table 6, page 71).  
Similarly, this is the case with the online training facilities described in section 3.3.4 (Staff 
training at NASA). In that section it was shown that NASA has 22 on-demand online courses 
available to staff though its APPEL portal (APPEL Course Catalog: On-demand Learning, 
undated). 
This shows that NASA has clearly expended significant effort and resources into I.T. systems 
designed to hold codified knowledge and make it available to NASA staff for reuse.  
 Facilitate conversations and exchange of tacit knowledge 
Despite the prevalence of systems to store codified knowledge, it was shown in section 3.2 
(NASA’s knowledge management strategy) that NASA also has many initiatives that are aimed 
at facilitating dialogue and tacit knowledge exchange among staff. To a large extent these 
manifest as events and communities of practice, which are not I.T. driven and therefore do 
not qualify in this analysis.  
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However, the Knowledge Map (NASA Knowledge Map, undated), also shows personalization 
initiatives that rely on I.T., such as Marshall Space Flight Center’s groups on ExplorNet, that 
functions as an expert-finder and discussion board, and its IdeaLab portal, where ideas, 
challenges and concepts can be posted. Langley Research Center also has an online 
Phonebook tool that functions as an expert-locator. 
The interview with Daria Topousis from the NASA Engineering Network (Under section 3.2.3 
Knowledge management at NASA centers, departments and projects, page 62) also showed 
how NEN’s online tools are relied on to support extensive communities of practice. The 50 
communities of practice supported by NEN reflect as a single entry on the Knowledge Map, 
under “knowledge networking” activities. This means that, apart from potentially being 
underweighted in the analysis, they are also classed as a personalization activity rather than 
the work of an I.T. system, even though the I.T. plays an integral role in their delivery.  
Therefore, although the ratio of “I.T. tools to facilitate conversations” versus “I.T. tools to 
store knowledge” seems low this could be because repositories are explicitly recognized on 
the Knowledge Map and therefore are more prominent, while tools that facilitate 
conversations, (such as email, staff directories and video-conferencing tools) are simply seem 
as part of the furniture and therefore not listed as “knowledge sharing initiatives”. 
 Conclusion on NASA’s I.T. strategy 
The analysis above shows how NASA appears to have invested significantly in I.T. tools to 
store codified knowledge, and they feature prominently on the organizations Knowledge 
Map. Where NASA’s Knowledge Map lists initiatives to promote the personal exchange of 
knowledge, it can be difficult to identify which of these are enabled through I.T. systems. 
However, although the investment in I.T. to facilitate conversations may not be easy to 
identify on the Knowledge Map, there is evidence from previous sections (such as the NEN 
interview) that these systems to support personalization of knowledge are pervasive 
throughout NASA.  
Therefore, while it is concluded that NASA appears to have an I.T. strategy geared towards 
supporting codification, there is known to be significant personalization of knowledge 
happening on the back of existing office infrastructure. Under Hansen et al.’s (1999) theory, 
the fact that NASA devotes significant resources to its information systems would suggest 
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that it is embracing a codification strategy, but there is also evidence (such as the NEN 
interview) that show that there is extensive support for personalization through NASA’s I.T. 
systems. As such, NASA can be judged to be straddling both codification and personalization, 
but perhaps with an emphasis on codification. 
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4. Discussion: Dominant versus Hybrid Strategies 
4.1 Dominant strategy and straddling 
Recall that a fundamental pronouncement of Hansen et al.’s (1999) paper was: 
“[…] companies that use knowledge effectively pursue one strategy predominantly and 
use the second strategy to support the first. We think of this as an 80-20 split: 80% of 
their knowledge sharing follows one strategy, 20% the other” (Hansen et al. 1999:112). 
Therefore, this section will consolidate the results of each of the sections in chapter 3 (Case 
Analysis) to determine if they add up to show an organization that is biased in favor of 
codification or personalization, or whether NASA is straddling both approaches using a more 
balanced knowledge management strategy.  
Recall that the tool that was to be used for this purpose was introduced in section 1.3 
(Methodology). This tool took the form of a table that will be used by reviewing the 
conclusions of sections 3.1 to 3.4 in chapter 3 (Case Analysis) and assigning a percentage 
weighting between characteristics of ‘codification’ and ‘personalization’. For example, a 
balance between both strategies could yield 50% in each column, while a biased approach 
would show an 80-20% split, respectively. This will show whether – on balance – one type of 
strategy is being favored or whether the emphasis is spread across both perspectives.  
At the commencement of this exercise it is important to note that allocating percentages to 
each organizational characteristic carries a high degree of subjectivity. This applies not only 
to the weighting within each category/organizational characteristic, but also to the weighting 
between each category/organizational characteristic. For example, does the human 
resources approach taken by the organization have as much impact as the competitive 
strategy? Intuitively it does not seem that it should, but it is difficult to propose an alternative. 
Therefore, it must be acknowledged that the percentages allocated here probably constitute 
the main subjective assumption in this analysis, and should be the first aspect of this analysis 
subjected to scrutiny when performing a sensitivity analysis.  
The following paragraphs provide a brief description of the findings under each aspect of the 
Case Analysis (undertaken in the previous chapter), and the percentage weighting that has 
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been accorded to each organizational characteristic depends on how closely it is considered 
to conform to Hansen et al.’s description of a codification or personalization organization.  
The evaluation of competitive strategy sought to show whether NASA was aiming to provide 
high quality and reliable products/services provision with fast turnaround and low costs 
indicative of codification, or customized, innovative products/services delivered by 
channeling individual expertise indicative of personalization. While NASA’s knowledge 
management journey showed how NASA went through the era of ‘Faster-Better-Cheaper’ and 
capturing knowledge in the LLIS in the 1990s, it did subsequently evolve its approach from 
around 2010. It did not abandon efforts by codification, but instead augmented them with an 
increased focus on collaboration and inter-personal sharing across the organization. This 
moved NASA’s competitive strategy away from from being exclusively about codification and 
increased the personalization component. However, emphasis on embedding knowledge in 
organizational practices and procedures, the focus on project teams and the sheet scale of 
collaboration across NASA also precluded NASA from being solely invested in a 
personalization strategy. Therefore, on competitive strategy, while NASA may have at one 
stage have fitted well with a personalization strategy before attempting to shift its focus to 
codification during the era of FBC, it has moved on to a balanced approach and currently does 
not fit exclusively with either of Hansen et al.’s archetypes. 
In terms of knowledge economics, the fundamental questions are about the extent of 
knowledge re-use and team composition. A high degree of knowledge re-use and teams with 
lots of junior staff relative to senior staff is characteristic of a codification strategy, while 
highly customized solutions from a small team with a high ratio of senior staff is indicative of 
a personalization strategy. NASA CKO’s explicitly state that knowledge re-use or reapplication 
is very important to NASA and they view codification and interpersonal transfer of knowledge 
as complements rather than substitutes.  NASA has put in place world-class standardized and 
online training facilities, and also rely heavily on embedding knowledge in practices and 
procedures rather than relying on databases and individual experience. When considered in 
conjunction with the large project teams involved at NASA, it is again not possible to identify 
NASA as being invested primarily in either a codification or a personalization strategy with 
their knowledge economics. For the reasons outlined above, competitive strategy and 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
 101 
 
knowledge economics are accorded a 50-50 weighting between codification and 
personalization in the summary table.  
Evaluating NASA’s knowledge management strategy needed to determine whether NASA was 
focusing on a people-to-documents approach (codification) or a people-to-people approach 
(personalization). NASA’s knowledge management journey showed how it had gone from 
relying on personalization (characterized by mentoring) in the 1980s, to an increased 
emphasis on codification in the 1990s, before taking a balanced approach from about 2010. 
The appointment of its first agency-level CKO saw a dual emphasis on knowledge capture as 
well as knowledge networks, again straddling both strategies. Knowledge management at 
each of the respective centers showed some variation in emphasis, but an overall 
acknowledgement of the need to address the need for codification as well as interpersonal 
sharing, and also the important point that much organizational knowledge can be stored in 
shared practices and procedures, such that it is neither codified or personalized, but rather 
embedded in the organization. Knoweldge stored in organizational practices and procedures 
does not fit with either category under Hansen et al. (1999) but remains an important part of 
NASA’s knowledge management practices. A review of the knowledge management 
initiatives recorded on the Agency’s Knowledge Map showed an emphasis on people-to-
documents initiatives, such that the knowledge management practices were accorded a 70-
30 weighting in favor of codification. The weighting was kept short of 80-20 as there were a 
number of significant people-to-people initiatives such that it could not be said that one 
approach was primary approach and the other subordinate or in a supporting role.  
The human resources strategy was evaluated using several variables, specifically mix of 
occupations, employee turnover, length of service and staff training. A personalization 
scenario was likely to see the recruitment of highly qualified individuals who remained with 
NASA for longer and were accorded personalized mentoring. A codification approach would 
likely exhibit higher recruitment of graduates and interns, higher staff turnover and shorter 
length of service, and standardized staff training delivered to groups or through online 
platforms. It was difficult to detect whether NASA was recruiting and developing graduates 
or hiring fully-fledged experts, but the high ratio of “S&E” (scientific and engineering) staff 
suggested personalization. Similarly, the low employee turnover and high average length of 
service pointed to strong staff retention and development, also indicative of an organization 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
102 
 
investing in personalization of knowledge. However, when it came of staff training, NASA had 
moved away from relying on mentoring as it did in the 1980s to more standardized training 
and online training facilities. Hansen et al. (1999) would see this as characteristic of a 
codification organization, but this may be because Hansen et al. had in the 1990s not 
envisaged the scale of NASA and the currently available level of technological advancement 
whereby online training can deliver an almost interpersonal experience. For this reason, the 
human resources approach is given a 70-30 weighting in favor of personalization.  
Evaluating the I.T. strategy in terms of Hansen et al.’s theory requires the distinction to made 
whether there is (i) a heavy investment in I.T. to connect staff with reusable content, or (ii) a 
moderate investment to facilitate interpersonal transfer of knowledge. This section was 
relatively short and drew on the results of the NASA Knowledge Map analysis to show that 
significant investment was being undertaken in connecting staff to reusable knowledge. In 
terms of NASA’s knowledge management journey, if the emphasis on using I.T. for 
codification was not there since the advent of NASA then it is likely to have arisen with the 
LLIS in the 1990s and continued since then. However, as I.T. systems have become more 
versatile since the 1990s it is expected that Hansen et al.’s definitions are becoming more 
difficult to interpret. For example, it was shown that in areas of NASA seemingly concerned 
only with codification (such as the NASA Engineering Network), the I.T. systems incorporate 
significant features to facilitate the personalization of knowledge through discussion boards 
and online communities of practice. Therefore, the weighting accorded to I.T. systems will 
lean only marginally in favor of codification at 60-40. The results of the populated table can 
be seen in Table 15 below: 
Table 15 Knowledge management strategic balance at NASA 
 Codification Personalization 
Competitive strategy & knowledge-economics 50% 50% 
Knowledge management strategy 70% 30% 
Human resources strategy 30% 70% 
I.T. strategy 60% 40% 
Overall result 53% 48% 
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It is interesting to note from the results in the table above that while the organization may 
have knowledge management practices (in the second row) predominantly geared towards 
codification, other aspects of the organization (in this case human resources practices) may 
be more supportive of personalization practices.  
The end result is that while NASA may favor one strategy more in some organizational aspects 
than in others, NASA on average adopts a balanced strategy. Under the individual 
organizational aspects there was no imbalance strong enough to show that one strategy is 
dominant and the other subordinate, or of one strategy being designated to a supporting role.  
It is important to re-emphasize what was noted under the evaluation of knowledge 
management strategy: that NASA’s practice of embedding knowledge in practices and 
procedures does not fit with Hansen et al.’s theory under either codification or 
personalization, and as such is an important part of NASA’s strategy that cannot be reconciled 
under Hansen et al.’s archetypes.  
The overall result, when taken as a simple average, shows a 53:48 split that is marginally in 
favor of codification. The conclusion that can be drawn from this is that when NASA’s 
competitive strategy, knowledge economics, knowledge management strategy, approach to 
human resources, and I.T. strategy are analyzed in line with the organizational characteristics 
laid out in Hansen et al.’s (1999) theory, NASA is found to be following a balanced approach 
to knowledge management. NASA does not appear to be significantly biased in favor of one 
strategy over the other, certainly not to the extent recommended by Hansen et al.’s 80-20 
rule. That is to say, NASA is straddling both codification and personalization strategies. 
The investigation into NASA’s knowledge management journey (section 3.2.1) since the 1980s 
provides another interesting aspect to this analysis, as the weightings in this table would 
certainly have fluctuated with the changes in practices between the 1980s and the present 
day. While there is insufficient data (i.e., on the prevalence of I.T. systems and human 
resources parameters) from those days, it is highly likely that the weighting would have been 
far more pronounced on the personalization side in the 1980s before adjusting to take on 
more codification characteristics in the 1990s with FBC, before achieving the present day’s 
middle-of-the-road strategy weighting.  
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Lastly, in terms of the percentage weightings, while it has already been stressed that the 
allocation of these percentages are liable to subjective judgement, the mathematics implicit 
in the table above offers some insight into how the table above would need to change to 
show an alternative conclusion (i.e., that NASA is an organization invested primarily in 
codification or personalization). To be judged as being in one category or the other, the 
overall result would need to show 80% or more in that one category. To achieve this, either 
the majority of categories would need to be judged as being greater than 80% to the extent 
that they compensate for those categories that are below 80% (thereby bringing the whole 
average up above 80%), or the categories greater than 80% would need to be weighted as 
contributing significantly more to the average than the other lesser categories. When viewed 
in these terms, it can be seen that the shift in percentages and underlying weightings would 
need to be significant to push to NASA into one category exclusively (e.g., over the 80% 
threshold), and the material presented in this analysis is unlikely to support such a conclusion. 
4.2 Success as an organization 
Now that it has been determined that NASA is straddling both codification and 
personalization strategies, the final part of analyzing Hansen et al.’s (1999) theory is to 
determine how NASA is performing as an organization.  
Recall that in their paper, Hansen et al. (1999) warn that: “Executives who try to excel at both 
[codification and personalization] strategies risk failing at both. Management consulting firms 
have run into serious trouble when they failed to with one approach” (1999: 112). 
Hansen et al. (1999) predict that the failure will be due to the organization undermining its 
own efficacy in terms of providing either a standardized solution versus a customized one, as 
well as the polarizing of staff into groups favoring one strategy or the other.  
The veracity of Hansen et al.’s (1999) predictions can be tested by reviewing data on 
organizational performance and on employee satisfaction. In an organization that straddles 
both strategies and results in poor organizational performance, it is reasonable to expect that 
this will manifest in dissatisfaction from staff. Alternatively, if it is found that the organization 
is performing well and the staff show a high level of satisfaction, then an explanation could 
be that the organization has a predominant focus on a single knowledge strategy and Hansen 
et al.’s prediction is robust. However, if it is found that the organization does not have a 
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dominant knowledge management strategy and is still succeeding with satisfied staff, then 
the prediction from Hansen et al.’s theory will be shown to be potentially inaccurate.  
 NASA’s performance in terms of strategic objectives 
To evaluate NASA’s performance as an organization requires a brief discussion of its strategic 
goals and objectives, and how they are measured. NASA’s strategic themes, goals and 
objectives are summarised in the table below: 
Table 16 NASA strategic themes, goals and objectives 
Theme Strategic Goal Strategic Objective 
Discover Expand human knowledge 
through new scientific 
discoveries 
 
1.1 Understand the Sun, Earth, Solar System, 
and Universe. 
1.2 Understand responses of physical and 
biological systems to spaceflight. 
Explore Extend human presence 
deeper into space and to 
the Moon for sustainable 
long-term exploration and 
utilization 
 
2.1 Lay the foundation for America to 
maintain a constant human presence in 
low Earth orbit enabled by a commercial 
market. 
2.2 Conduct human exploration in deep 
space, including to the surface of the 
Moon. 
Develop Address national challenges 
and catalyze economic 
growth 
 
3.1 Develop and transfer revolutionary 
technologies to enable exploration 
capabilities for NASA and the nation. 
3.2 Transform aviation through 
revolutionary technology research, 
development and transfer. 
3.3 Inspire and engage the public in 
aeronautics, space and science. 
Enable Optimize capabilities and 
operations 
 
4.1 Engage in partnership strategies. 
4.2 Enable space access and services. 
4.3 Assure safety and mission success. 
4.4 Manage human capital.  
4.5 Ensure enterprise protection. 
4.6 Sustain infrastructure capabilities and 
operations. 
(FY 2019 Volume of Integrated Performance, undated: 21)  
Strategic goals are broken down into strategic objectives. Strategic goals may have a number 
of underlying programs and/or projects, are further devolved into performance goals and 
annual performance indicators. Performance goals describe the multiyear performance of a 
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program or project. Annual performance indicators only show a single year of a program or 
project. This means that a project’s performance can be evaluated for that year as well as 
over the project lifetime.  
Table 17 Example: strategic goal devolved to specific annual performance indicator 
Strategic goal Expand human knowledge through new scientific discoveries 
 
Strategic objective 1.1 Understand the Sun, Earth, Solar System, and Universe. 
 
Performance goal (PG) Send a satellite into orbit by 2025 [years into future] 
Annual performance 
indicator (API) 
Complete specification of satellite processing module [this year]. 
  
NASA utilizes a system of color rankings to rate its performance goals and its annual 
performance indicators. The colors follow a stop-light sequence of red/yellow/green as 
explained below: 
Table 18 NASA performance color rankings 
Green On track or complete – NASA completed or expects to 
Yellow 
Slightly below target and/or behind schedule – NASA completed or expects to 
complete this performance measure but is slightly below the target and/or 
moderately behind schedule. 
Red 
Significantly below target and/or behind schedule – NASA did not or does not 
expect to complete this performance measure within the estimated timeframe. 
The program is substantially below the target and/or significantly behind 
schedule.  
White 
A performance measure cannot be assessed against its success criteria and 
NASA senior management cancel or postpone the measure. NASA is no longer 
pursuing activities related to the performance of this measure or the program 
did not have activities during that fiscal year. 
(FY 2019 Volume of Integrated Performance, undated: 21)  
Figure 6 below ranks the achievement of the multi-year performance goals and the annual 
performance indicators for each of the strategic goals (Discover, Explore, Develop, Enable). 
This shows that across all the strategic goals the ratings are predominantly ‘green’, showing 
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that everything is on-track. The majority of projects outside of the ‘green’ category are ranked 
‘yellow’ – slightly below target or behind schedule, and by no means indicates failure. 
Figure 6 Multi-year and annual performance indicators for FY 2017 
6.1 Performance Goals (multi-year) 6.2 Annual Performance Indicators 
  
(FY 2019 Volume of Integrated Performance, undated: 21) 
The two graphs above can be further aggregated to show the overall progress of the Agency 
(Figure 7 below). This shows the overall number of projects in each of the categories of green, 
yellow, red and white.  
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Figure 7 Overall Performance Goals and Annual Performance Indicators for FY 2017 
7.1 Performance Goals 7.2 Annual Performance Indicators 
  
(FY 2019 Volume of Integrated Performance, undated: 21) 
From Figure 7.1 above, it can be seen that for overall performance goals reflecting the health 
of the project over its multi-year lifetime, 84% of are in the green (on-track or complete), 16% 
are yellow (slightly below target and/or behind schedule), and 1% are red (significantly below 
target and/or behind schedule).  
From Figure 7.2 above, it can be seen that for annual performance indicators, 87% of are in 
the green (on-track or complete), 9% are yellow (slightly below target and/or behind 
schedule), 3% are red (significantly below target and/or behind schedule), 1% are white 
(performance measure cannot be assessed at this time). 
From these figures it is apparent that the majority of projects and programs at NASA are under 
control and progressing according to plan. Hansen et al.’s (1999) framework predicts that if 
NASA was straddling two knowledge strategies it is likely to encounter problems and 
undermine its own efficiency and effectiveness. However, if this were the case, it is unlikely 
that annual performance indicators or performance goals would be at 87% and 84% green, 
respectively. These indicators suggest that NASA is an effective and successful organization.  
 Employee satisfaction 
Hansen et al.’s (1999) theory discusses how mixing knowledge strategies can polarize staff 
into those who want to pursue a standardized approach versus those who want to develop 
novel solutions to problems (Hansen et al., 1999: 114). Hansen et al. go on to point out how 
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this can lead to problems as “employees will be confused about priorities” (Hansen et al., 
1999: 116).  
Under Hansen et al.’s (1999) theory, it would then follow that under circumstances where an 
organization is unsuccessfully attempting to straddle two different knowledge strategies, 
there is likely to be a negative impact on employee satisfaction.  
Levels of employee dissatisfaction, confusion or frustration that would negatively impact on 
organization performance are likely to be detectable in workplace satisfaction surveys. By 
reviewing the results of an independent employee workplace satisfaction survey for NASA, it 
should be possible to see if there is any evidence of these levels of confusion.  
The ‘Partnership for Public Service’ is a non-profit, nonpartisan organization that has been 
undertaking workplace surveys since 2003 using a statistical model developed in 
collaboration with the CFI Group that is also employed in the CFI Group’s American Customer 
Satisfaction Index.  
The Partnership for Public Service produces the ‘Best Places to Work’ survey that is published 
on bestplacestowork.org, and the rankings for 2017 have been calculated based on the views 
of more than 498,000 civil servants from 410 federal organizations on a wide range of 
workplace topics (‘Best Places to Work in the Federal Government’, 2017). 
In the survey results, NASA ranks in first place among 18 large government agencies. In 2017 
it achieved an index score of 80.9, 2.3 points up from 2016. This is reportedly the sixth 
consecutive year that NASA has been ranked the best workplace among large federal agencies 
(‘NASA's employee satisfaction continues to soar’, 2017).  
NASA has shown an upward trend in employee satisfaction for the past 7 years (since 2011), 
and an overall upward trajectory since 2007 (‘Best Places to Work in the Federal 
Government’, 2017).  
Table 19 NASA Workplace Satisfaction Index Score (2005 - 2017) 
YEAR 2005 2007 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 
SATISFACTION 69.9 69.7 71.7 74.2 72.5 72.8 74 74.6 76 78.6 80.9 
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Figure 8 NASA Workplace Satisfaction Index Score (2005 - 2017) 
 
 
The decline observed in the chart above during 2011 may have been due to the retirement of 
NASA’s three space shuttles. A former NASA astronaut was quoted in a new article during this 
period saying that this had led to uncertainty and low morale in the organization (‘With 
‘Coolest Job Ever’ Ending, Astronauts Seek Next Frontier’, 2011). The shuttles Discovery, 
Endeavour and Atlantis were retired in March, June and July of 2011, respectively, and 
marked the end of the 30-year space shuttle program (‘Space Shuttle Retirement’, 2018). The 
explanation that staff satisfaction was negatively affected by this event seems consistent, 
rather than suggesting that it was due to employee confusion stemming from inefficient 
knowledge practices or organizational failure stemming from poor knowledge practices.  
The survey results show a high level of workplace satisfaction among staff at NASA, and where 
there was a decline in workplace satisfaction it appears to be due to extraneous factors. Being 
able to apply both codification and personalization equally and still exhibit high levels of 
workplace satisfaction is not consistent with Hansen et al.’s (1999) theory. 
 Conclusion on success of NASA as a knowledge-based organization 
The information presented above on NASA’s performance show that the organization is 
meeting both its annual performance objectives and its long-term project objectives. With 
87% and 84% of short- and long-term project objectives rated as ‘on-track or completed’, 
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respectively, this can be taken to show an organization that is functioning effectively in a 
knowledge-intensive sector.  
The information on staff satisfaction show that staff are more satisfied working at NASA than 
at any other large federal organization. Satisfaction has increased steadily over the years, and 
where there is evidence of past dissatisfaction, this can be linked to other extraneous events. 
It seems unlikely that employees at NASA could exhibit such a high level of workplace 
satisfaction and yet also be confused about knowledge practices to the extent that the 
organization is at risk of overall failure.  
Chapter 4 (Discussion) has shown that that the evidence all points to NASA as straddling both 
codification and personalization strategies. Hansen et al.’s (1999) theory would therefore 
predict that the organization would be encountering difficulties as a result, but the analysis 
in this chapter shows high levels of operational performance and employee satisfaction. This 
suggests that Hansen et al.’s theory is not robust when it comes to predicting the relationship 
between knowledge management strategy and organizational performance.  
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5. Conclusion 
Section 1.3 (methodology) described how Hansen et al.’s (1999) theory could be tested 
against NASA’s knowledge management strategy to determine its robustness and proposed 
that there were four potential outcomes to the analysis. These were shown in Table 1 in 
section 1.3 and have been repeated here as Table 20 below.  
The analysis conducted in this study showed that the knowledge management activities 
undertaken at NASA do not conform to the characteristics of an organization emphasizing a 
codification or personalization strategy, as recommended by Hansen et al.’s (1999). The 
analysis also shows that, contrary to predictions by Hansen et al., this has not been 
detrimental for NASA’s performance as an organization. This would place it at “Outcome 4” 
on the table below: 
Table 20 Outcome of the analysis 
 
As such, when it comes to testing Hansen et al.’s (1999) theory using NASA’s knowledge 
management strategy, Hansen et al.’s theory was overall not found to be robust.   
Reviews of papers by other authors agree that while Hansen et al.’s (1999) recommendation 
that the organization’s knowledge management strategy needs to match its competitive 
strategy, there is consensus that Hansen et al.’s prescription to emphasize one strategy over 
another in an 80-20 mix is flawed, and that there may be benefits to be had from a more 
balanced approach. This is supported by the results of this analysis, where NASA is following 
a balanced approach in terms of knowledge management strategy and has not found this to 
be detrimental to the performance of the organization.  
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The weaknesses in Hansen et al.’s (1999) theory may arise from the fact that, conceptually 
speaking, Hansen et al. seems to be an adherent to the epistemology of possession [of 
knowledge]. This is a relatively outdated concept of knowledge that takes a material view of 
knowledge, perceiving that it can be possessed, accumulated and transferred.  This view 
neglects the role of the organization and how knowledge can be the result of shared practices 
and processes. This meant that were NASA CKOs pointed to knowledge being held in 
organizational processes and procedures, this could not be classified according to Hansen et 
al.’s archetypes.   
As a result, Hansen et al. (1999) is subject to a number of limitations, specifically: 
(i) Hansen et al. (1999) perceive knowledge is either recorded in rule-sets under 
codification or kept in the head of the individual expert as per personalization. 
Hansen et al. disregard the role of the organization and of processes and practices 
as ways in which knowledge can be accumulated in an organization.  
(ii) Hansen et al. (1999) perceive codification and personalization to exist in tension 
with one another, rather than as complements.  
(iii) Innovation cannot take place without an expert to deliver it, and an innovative 
organization cannot grow unless it accumulates more individual experts. 
Consequently, Hansen et al.’s (1999) theory implies difficulties for an innovative 
company that wants to scale up.  
This puts NASA at odds with Hansen et al. (1999) with respect to the limitations described 
above, as NASA believe that: 
(i) Knowledge can be held in experts and in codified in databases, but also in teams 
and in the organization (through its policies and procedures). 
(ii) Codification and personalization are needed as complements, to bridge gaps in 
personal knowledge, personal networks or codified knowledge.  
(iii) Therefore, innovation is an incremental process that relies on referencing all three 
sources, and is not subject to the limitations of the individual.  
However, this study also shows that NASA has not always operated under its current 
knowledge management methodology. Instead it has gone through an evolution in terms of 
its knowledge management activities. Using the characteristics described by Hansen et al.’s 
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(1999) archetypes, it is possible to see that in the past NASA was consistent with Hansen et 
al.’s recommendations to emphasize one knowledge management approach over the other. 
NASA had an emphasis on personalization in the 1980s that changed to and emphasis on 
codification in the 1990s, and finally settled on a balanced approach from around 2012 
onwards.  
This study has shown that Hansen et al.’s (1999) theory is a useful extension of Nonaka’s 
(1991) categories of tacit and explicit knowledge, and to illustrate how organizational 
characteristics can support the link between knowledge management strategy and 
competitive strategy. While there is the acknowledged shortcoming in Hansen et al.’s theory 
that it should not necessarily be taken as a prescription to manage knowledge in an 
organization using only one approach, this study has shown that there may be merit in 
considering a balanced approach, and that a balanced approach can in fact help to overcome 
knowledge gaps in an organization. 
Hansen et al.’s (1999) archetypical codification- and personalization-based organizations may 
be extreme examples seldom practiced in reality, but they provides useful summaries of the 
sort of organizational characteristics that would characterize approaches from each end of 
the codification and personalization spectrum. Therefore, although knowledge management 
strategy has moved beyond Hansen et al.’s theory, it is the characteristics of Hansen et al.’s 
archetypes that enable us to pinpoint how NASA has evolved its knowledge management 
strategy to encompass the best of both codification and personalization strategies to address 
the challenges of tacit and explicit knowledge.  
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